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-rw-r--r--app-shells/ksh/files/CVE-2019-14868.patch89
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 89 deletions
diff --git a/app-shells/ksh/files/CVE-2019-14868.patch b/app-shells/ksh/files/CVE-2019-14868.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d5c80566bafc..000000000000
--- a/app-shells/ksh/files/CVE-2019-14868.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-From c7de8b641266bac7c77942239ac659edfee9ecd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kurtis Rader <krader@skepticism.us>
-Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 18:46:50 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Harden env var imports
-
----
- src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
- src/cmd/ksh93/tests/subshell.sh | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++
-
-diff --git a/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c b/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c
-index 30b3067590a2..8e68cbdc868a 100644
---- a/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c
-+++ b/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c
-@@ -567,19 +567,32 @@ Sfdouble_t sh_strnum(Shell_t *shp, const char *str, char **ptr, int mode) {
- char *last;
-
- if (*str == 0) {
-- if (ptr) *ptr = (char *)str;
-- return 0;
-- }
-- errno = 0;
-- d = number(str, &last, shp->inarith ? 0 : 10, NULL);
-- if (*last) {
-- if (*last != '.' || last[1] != '.') {
-- d = strval(shp, str, &last, arith, mode);
-- Varsubscript = true;
-+ d = 0.0;
-+ last = (char *)str;
-+ } else {
-+ d = number(str, &last, shp->inarith ? 0 : 10, NULL);
-+ if (*last && !shp->inarith && sh_isstate(shp, SH_INIT)) {
-+ // This call is to handle "base#value" literals if we're importing untrusted env vars.
-+ d = number(str, &last, 0, NULL);
-+ }
-+ if (*last) {
-+ if (sh_isstate(shp, SH_INIT)) {
-+ // Initializing means importing untrusted env vars. Since the string does not appear
-+ // to be a recognized numeric literal give up. We can't safely call strval() since
-+ // that allows arbitrary expressions which would create a security vulnerability.
-+ d = 0.0;
-+ } else {
-+ if (*last != '.' || last[1] != '.') {
-+ d = strval(shp, str, &last, arith, mode);
-+ Varsubscript = true;
-+ }
-+ if (!ptr && *last && mode > 0) {
-+ errormsg(SH_DICT, ERROR_exit(1), e_lexbadchar, *last, str);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ } else if (d == 0.0 && *str == '-') {
-+ d = -0.0;
- }
-- if (!ptr && *last && mode > 0) errormsg(SH_DICT, ERROR_exit(1), e_lexbadchar, *last, str);
-- } else if (!d && *str == '-') {
-- d = -0.0;
- }
- if (ptr) *ptr = last;
- return d;
-diff --git a/src/cmd/ksh93/tests/subshell.sh b/src/cmd/ksh93/tests/subshell.sh
-index b63a8051ed5c..3faba475d6de 100644
---- a/src/cmd/ksh93/tests/subshell.sh
-+++ b/src/cmd/ksh93/tests/subshell.sh
-@@ -856,3 +856,26 @@ for exp in 65535 65536
- do got=$($SHELL -c 'x=$(printf "%.*c" '$exp' x); print ${#x}' 2>&1)
- [[ $got == $exp ]] || log_error "large command substitution failed" "$exp" "$got"
- done
-+
-+# ==========
-+# Verify that importing untrusted env vars does not allow evaluating arbitrary expressions but does
-+# recognize all integer literals recognized by ksh.
-+expect=8
-+actual=$(env SHLVL='7' $SHELL -c 'echo $SHLVL')
-+[[ $actual == $expect ]] || log_error "decimal int literal not recognized" "$expect" "$actual"
-+
-+expect=14
-+actual=$(env SHLVL='013' $SHELL -c 'echo $SHLVL')
-+[[ $actual == $expect ]] || log_error "leading zeros int literal not recognized" "$expect" "$actual"
-+
-+expect=4
-+actual=$(env SHLVL='2#11' $SHELL -c 'echo $SHLVL')
-+[[ $actual == $expect ]] || log_error "base#value int literal not recognized" "$expect" "$actual"
-+
-+expect=12
-+actual=$(env SHLVL='16#B' $SHELL -c 'echo $SHLVL')
-+[[ $actual == $expect ]] || log_error "base#value int literal not recognized" "$expect" "$actual"
-+
-+expect=1
-+actual=$(env SHLVL="2#11+x[\$($bin_echo DANGER WILL ROBINSON >&2)0]" $SHELL -c 'echo $SHLVL')
-+[[ $actual == $expect ]] || log_error "expression allowed on env var import" "$expect" "$actual"