reinit the tree, so we can have metadata

25 files changed, 2250 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fa33af39b6f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+the last nibble of the openssl version represents the status.  that is,
+whether it is a beta or release.  when it comes to version checks in
+openssh, this component does not matter, so ignore it.
+
+https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2212
+
+--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
+ 	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+ 	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+ 	 */
+-	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
++	mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor,status */
+ 	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+ 	lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+ 	if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3-mips-seccomp-n32.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3-mips-seccomp-n32.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7eaadaf11cda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3-mips-seccomp-n32.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/591392
+https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2590
+
+7.3 added seccomp support to MIPS, but failed to handled the N32
+case.  This patch is temporary until upstream fixes.
+
+--- openssh-7.3p1/configure.ac
++++ openssh-7.3p1/configure.ac
+@@ -816,10 +816,10 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
+ 		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
+ 		;;
+ 	mips64-*)
+-		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32
+ 		;;
+ 	mips64el-*)
+-		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
++		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32
+ 		;;
+ 	esac
+ 	if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..806b36d0ca94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/165444
+https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1008
+
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++	oGssTrustDns,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -194,9 +195,11 @@
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -930,6 +933,10 @@
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssTrustDns:
++		intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1649,6 +1656,7 @@
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1779,6 +1787,8 @@
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
+ 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+ 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
++	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -830,6 +830,16 @@
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -656,6 +656,13 @@
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int ok = 0;
++	const char *gss_host;
++
++	if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++		extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns);
++		gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
++	} else
++		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
+ 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ 	 * once. */
+@@ -668,7 +674,7 @@
+ 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ 		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+-		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host)) {
+ 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ 		} else {
+ 			mech++;
+
+need to move these two funcs back to canohost so they're available to clients
+and the server.  auth.c is only used in the server.
+
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -784,117 +784,3 @@ fakepw(void)
+ 
+ 	return (&fake);
+ }
+-
+-/*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+-	socklen_t fromlen;
+-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+-	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+-	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+-	/* Get IP address of client. */
+-	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+-	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+-	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+-	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+-		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+-		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+-	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+-	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+-	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+-		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+-	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+-	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+-	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+-		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+-		    name, ntop);
+-		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+-	lowercase(name);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+-	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+-	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+-	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+-	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+-	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+-	 * the domain).
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+-		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+-		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+-	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+-		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+-		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+-		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+-				break;
+-	}
+-	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+-	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+-	if (ai == NULL) {
+-		/* Address not found for the host name. */
+-		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+-		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	return strdup(name);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+- * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+- * several times.
+- */
+-
+-const char *
+-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+-{
+-	static char *dnsname;
+-
+-	if (!use_dns)
+-		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-	else if (dnsname != NULL)
+-		return dnsname;
+-	else {
+-		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-		return dnsname;
+-	}
+-}
+--- a/canohost.c
++++ b/canohost.c
+@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock)
+ {
+ 	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
++ * called.
++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
++ */
++
++static char *
++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct sockaddr_storage from;
++	socklen_t fromlen;
++	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
++	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
++	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++
++	/* Get IP address of client. */
++	fromlen = sizeof(from);
++	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
++	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
++	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
++		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
++	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
++		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
++
++	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
++	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
++	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
++	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
++		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
++	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
++	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
++	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
++		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
++		    name, ntop);
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
++	lowercase(name);
++
++	/*
++	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
++	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
++	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
++	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
++	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
++	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
++	 * the domain).
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
++		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
++		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
++	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
++		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
++		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
++		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
++				break;
++	}
++	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
++	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
++	if (ai == NULL) {
++		/* Address not found for the host name. */
++		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
++		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	return strdup(name);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
++ * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
++ * several times.
++ */
++
++const char *
++auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
++{
++	static char *dnsname;
++
++	if (!use_dns)
++		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++	else if (dnsname != NULL)
++		return dnsname;
++	else {
++		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
++		return dnsname;
++	}
++}
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-NEWKEYS_null_deref.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-NEWKEYS_null_deref.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..784cd2aa7efb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-NEWKEYS_null_deref.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/595342
+
+Backport of
+https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/patch/?id=28652bca29046f62c7045e933e6b931de1d16737
+
+--- openssh-7.3p1/kex.c
++++ openssh-7.3p1/kex.c
+@@ -419,6 +419,8 @@
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
++	if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
++		return r;
+ 	kex->done = 1;
+ 	sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
+ 	/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
+--- openssh-7.3p1/packet.c
++++ openssh-7.3p1/packet.c
+@@ -1919,9 +1919,7 @@
+ 			return r;
+ 		return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ 	}
+-	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+-		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
+-	else if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
++	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
+ 		r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
+ 	else
+ 		r = 0;
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-Unregister-the-KEXINIT-handler-after-receive.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-Unregister-the-KEXINIT-handler-after-receive.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8603601ca7b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-Unregister-the-KEXINIT-handler-after-receive.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/597360
+
+From ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "markus@openbsd.org" <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2016 19:28:48 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
+
+Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been
+received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause
+allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by
+shilei-c at 360.cn
+
+Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05
+---
+ kex.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 3f97f8c00919..6a94bc535bd7 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 	if (kex == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
+ 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+-- 
+2.11.0.rc2
+
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-fix-ssh1-with-no-ssh1-host-key.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-fix-ssh1-with-no-ssh1-host-key.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7fb0d8069b94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-fix-ssh1-with-no-ssh1-host-key.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/592122
+
+From e600348a7afd6325cc5cd783cb424065cbc20434 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2016 04:23:55 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
+
+Fix bug introduced in rev 1.467 which causes
+"buffer_get_bignum_ret: incomplete message" errors when built with WITH_SSH1
+and run such that no Protocol 1 ephemeral host key is generated (eg "Protocol
+2", no SSH1 host key supplied).  Reported by rainer.laatsch at t-online.de,
+ok deraadt@
+
+Upstream-ID: aa6b132da5c325523aed7989cc5a320497c919dc
+---
+ sshd.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 799c7711f49c..9fc829a91bc8 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
+ 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	} else
+ #endif
+-		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0)
++		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
+ 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+ #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
+-- 
+2.11.0.rc2
+
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-12-x509-9.2-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-12-x509-9.2-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0602307128f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-12-x509-9.2-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+--- a/0003-Add-support-for-the-multi-threaded-AES-CTR-cipher.patch
++++ b/0003-Add-support-for-the-multi-threaded-AES-CTR-cipher.patch
+@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@
+ @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
+  LD=@LD@
+  CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+- CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ -LIBS=@LIBS@
+ +LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread
+  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+--- a/0004-support-dynamically-sized-receive-buffers.patch
++++ b/0004-support-dynamically-sized-receive-buffers.patch
+@@ -2144,9 +2144,9 @@
+ @@ -527,10 +555,10 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
+  	/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+  	if (compat20) {
+- 		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
+--		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
+-+		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
++ 		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s PKIX[%s]\r\n",
++-		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, SSH_X509);
+++		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE, SSH_X509);
+  	} else {
+  		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
+ -		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
+@@ -2163,9 +2163,9 @@
+ @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@
+  	}
+  
+- 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
+--	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
+-+	    major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
++ 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s%s",
++-	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION, comment,
+++	    major, minor, SSH_RELEASE, comment,
+  	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+  	    options.version_addendum, newline);
+  
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-cipher-ctr-mt-no-deadlocks.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-cipher-ctr-mt-no-deadlocks.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9cc7b61a6ab5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-cipher-ctr-mt-no-deadlocks.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+diff --git a/cipher-ctr-mt.c b/cipher-ctr-mt.c
+index fdc9b2f..300cd90 100644
+--- a/cipher-ctr-mt.c
++++ b/cipher-ctr-mt.c
+@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ struct kq {
+ 	u_char		keys[KQLEN][AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ 	u_char		ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ 	u_char		pad0[CACHELINE_LEN];
+-	volatile int	qstate;
++	int		qstate;
+ 	pthread_mutex_t	lock;
+ 	pthread_cond_t	cond;
+ 	u_char		pad1[CACHELINE_LEN];
+@@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
+ 	STATS_STRUCT(stats);
+ 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ 	pthread_t	tid[CIPHER_THREADS];
++	pthread_rwlock_t tid_lock;
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++	pthread_rwlock_t stop_lock;
++	int		exit_flag;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
+ 	int		state;
+ 	int		qidx;
+ 	int		ridx;
+@@ -187,6 +192,57 @@ thread_loop_cleanup(void *x)
+ 	pthread_mutex_unlock((pthread_mutex_t *)x);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++/* Check if we should exit, we are doing both cancel and exit condition
++ * since on OSX threads seem to occasionally fail to notice when they have
++ * been cancelled. We want to have a backup to make sure that we won't hang
++ * when the main process join()-s the cancelled thread.
++ */
++static void
++thread_loop_check_exit(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c)
++{
++	int exit_flag;
++
++	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->stop_lock);
++	exit_flag = c->exit_flag;
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock);
++
++	if (exit_flag)
++		pthread_exit(NULL);
++}
++#else
++# define thread_loop_check_exit(s)
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++/*
++ * Helper function to terminate the helper threads
++ */
++static void
++stop_and_join_pregen_threads(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c)
++{
++	int i;
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++	/* notify threads that they should exit */
++	pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->stop_lock);
++	c->exit_flag = TRUE;
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock);
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++	/* Cancel pregen threads */
++	for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++) {
++		pthread_cancel(c->tid[i]);
++	}
++	for (i = 0; i < NUMKQ; i++) {
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[i].lock);
++		pthread_cond_broadcast(&c->q[i].cond);
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[i].lock);
++	}
++	for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++) {
++		pthread_join(c->tid[i], NULL);
++	}
++}
++
+ /*
+  * The life of a pregen thread:
+  *    Find empty keystream queues and fill them using their counter.
+@@ -201,6 +257,7 @@ thread_loop(void *x)
+ 	struct kq *q;
+ 	int i;
+ 	int qidx;
++	pthread_t first_tid;
+ 
+ 	/* Threads stats on cancellation */
+ 	STATS_INIT(stats);
+@@ -211,11 +268,15 @@ thread_loop(void *x)
+ 	/* Thread local copy of AES key */
+ 	memcpy(&key, &c->aes_ctx, sizeof(key));
+ 
++	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->tid_lock);
++	first_tid = c->tid[0];
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Handle the special case of startup, one thread must fill
+ 	 * the first KQ then mark it as draining. Lock held throughout.
+ 	 */
+-	if (pthread_equal(pthread_self(), c->tid[0])) {
++	if (pthread_equal(pthread_self(), first_tid)) {
+ 		q = &c->q[0];
+ 		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
+ 		if (q->qstate == KQINIT) {
+@@ -245,12 +306,16 @@ thread_loop(void *x)
+ 		/* Check if I was cancelled, also checked in cond_wait */
+ 		pthread_testcancel();
+ 
++		/* Check if we should exit as well */
++		thread_loop_check_exit(c);
++
+ 		/* Lock queue and block if its draining */
+ 		q = &c->q[qidx];
+ 		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
+ 		pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_cleanup, &q->lock);
+ 		while (q->qstate == KQDRAINING || q->qstate == KQINIT) {
+ 			STATS_WAIT(stats);
++			thread_loop_check_exit(c);
+ 			pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
+ 		}
+ 		pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
+@@ -268,6 +333,7 @@ thread_loop(void *x)
+ 		 * can see that it's being filled.
+ 		 */
+ 		q->qstate = KQFILLING;
++		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
+ 		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
+ 		for (i = 0; i < KQLEN; i++) {
+ 			AES_encrypt(q->ctr, q->keys[i], &key);
+@@ -279,7 +345,7 @@ thread_loop(void *x)
+ 		ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * (NUMKQ - 1), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ 		q->qstate = KQFULL;
+ 		STATS_FILL(stats);
+-		pthread_cond_signal(&q->cond);
++		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
+ 		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -371,6 +437,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+ 				pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
+ 			}
+ 			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
++			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
+ 			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
+ 
+ 			/* Mark consumed queue empty and signal producers */
+@@ -397,6 +464,11 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+ 
+ 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+ 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&c->tid_lock, NULL);
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&c->stop_lock, NULL);
++		c->exit_flag = FALSE;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
+ 
+ 		c->state = HAVE_NONE;
+ 		for (i = 0; i < NUMKQ; i++) {
+@@ -409,11 +481,14 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
+-		/* Cancel pregen threads */
+-		for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++)
+-			pthread_cancel(c->tid[i]);
+-		for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++)
+-			pthread_join(c->tid[i], NULL);
++		/* tell the pregen threads to exit */
++		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++		/* reset the exit flag */
++		c->exit_flag = FALSE;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
+ 		/* Start over getting key & iv */
+ 		c->state = HAVE_NONE;
+ 	}
+@@ -444,10 +519,12 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+ 		/* Start threads */
+ 		for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++) {
+ 			debug("spawned a thread");
++			pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->tid_lock);
+ 			pthread_create(&c->tid[i], NULL, thread_loop, c);
++			pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
+ 		}
+ 		pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[0].lock);
+-		while (c->q[0].qstate != KQDRAINING)
++		while (c->q[0].qstate == KQINIT)
+ 			pthread_cond_wait(&c->q[0].cond, &c->q[0].lock);
+ 		pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[0].lock);
+ 	}
+@@ -461,15 +538,10 @@ void
+ ssh_aes_ctr_thread_destroy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+-	int i;
++
+ 	c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
+-	/* destroy threads */
+-	for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++) {
+-		pthread_cancel(c->tid[i]);
+-	}
+-	for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++) {
+-		pthread_join(c->tid[i], NULL);
+-	}
++
++	stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -481,7 +553,9 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_thread_reconstruction(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ 	/* reconstruct threads */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++) {
+ 		debug("spawned a thread");
++		pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->tid_lock);
+ 		pthread_create(&c->tid[i], NULL, thread_loop, c);
++		pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+@@ -489,18 +563,13 @@ static int
+ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+-	int i;
+ 
+ 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+ #ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
+ 		debug("main thread: %u drains, %u waits", c->stats.drains,
+ 				c->stats.waits);
+ #endif
+-		/* Cancel pregen threads */
+-		for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++)
+-			pthread_cancel(c->tid[i]);
+-		for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++)
+-			pthread_join(c->tid[i], NULL);
++		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
+ 
+ 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+ 		free(c);
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-x509-9.2-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-x509-9.2-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f077c0517fa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-x509-9.2-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+--- a/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-14.10-r1.patch	2016-09-19 15:00:21.561121417 -0700
++++ b/openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-14.10-r1.patch	2016-09-19 15:22:51.337118439 -0700
+@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@
+ @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
+  LD=@LD@
+  CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+- CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ -LIBS=@LIBS@
+ +LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread
+  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+@@ -2144,12 +2144,12 @@
+  	/* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
+  	if (options.bind_address == NULL && !privileged)
+  		return sock;
+-@@ -527,10 +555,10 @@
++@@ -555,10 +583,10 @@
+  	/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+  	if (compat20) {
+- 		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
+--		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
+-+		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
++ 		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s PKIX[%s]\r\n",
++-		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, SSH_X509);
+++		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE, SSH_X509);
+  	} else {
+  		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
+ -		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
+@@ -2163,9 +2163,9 @@
+ @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@
+  	}
+  
+- 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
+--	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
+-+	    major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
++ 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s%s",
++-	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION, comment,
+++	    major, minor, SSH_RELEASE, comment,
+  	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+  	    options.version_addendum, newline);
+  
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-sctp-x509-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-sctp-x509-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2def6993e6c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-sctp-x509-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+--- a/openssh-7.3_p1-sctp.patch	2016-08-03 13:10:15.733228732 -0700
++++ b/openssh-7.3_p1-sctp.patch	2016-08-03 13:25:53.274630002 -0700
+@@ -226,14 +226,6 @@
+  .Op Fl c Ar cipher
+  .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+  .Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+-@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+- .It ServerAliveCountMax
+- .It StrictHostKeyChecking
+- .It TCPKeepAlive
+-+.It Transport
+- .It UpdateHostKeys
+- .It UsePrivilegedPort
+- .It User
+ @@ -224,6 +225,8 @@ and
+  to print debugging messages about their progress.
+  This is helpful in
+@@ -493,19 +485,11 @@
+  .Sh SYNOPSIS
+  .Nm ssh
+  .Bk -words
+--.Op Fl 1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
+-+.Op Fl 1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYyz
++-.Op Fl 1246AaCdfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
+++.Op Fl 1246AaCdfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYyz
+  .Op Fl b Ar bind_address
+  .Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
+  .Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port
+-@@ -558,6 +558,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+- .It StreamLocalBindUnlink
+- .It StrictHostKeyChecking
+- .It TCPKeepAlive
+-+.It Transport
+- .It Tunnel
+- .It TunnelDevice
+- .It UpdateHostKeys
+ @@ -795,6 +796,8 @@ controls.
+  .Pp
+  .It Fl y
+@@ -533,18 +517,18 @@
+  usage(void)
+  {
+  	fprintf(stderr,
+--"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
+-+"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy" SCTP_OPT "] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
++-"usage: ssh [-1246AaCdfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
+++"usage: ssh [-1246AaCdfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy" SCTP_OPT "] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
+  "           [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char]\n"
+- "           [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]\n"
+- "           [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]\n"
++ "           [-F configfile]\n"
++ #ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+ @@ -608,7 +613,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+- 	argv0 = av[0];
++ #  define ENGCONFIG ""
++ #endif
+  
+-  again:
+--	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
+-+	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx" SCTP_OPT
+- 	    "ACD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
++-	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:de:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
+++	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:de:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx" SCTP_OPT
++ 	    "ACD:E:F:" ENGCONFIG "I:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
+  		switch (opt) {
+  		case '1':
+ @@ -857,6 +862,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-x509-9.2-warnings.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-x509-9.2-warnings.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..528dc6f22a94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.3_p1-x509-9.2-warnings.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 143227a..c9b84c2 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -345,9 +345,9 @@ kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
+ static int
+ kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
++#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_RSA_SHA2_256
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_RSA_SHA2_256
+ /* IMPORTANT NOTE:
+  * Do not offer rsa-sha2-* until is resolved misconfiguration issue
+  * with allowed public key algorithms!
+diff --git a/key-eng.c b/key-eng.c
+index 9bc50fd..bc0d03d 100644
+--- a/key-eng.c
++++ b/key-eng.c
+@@ -786,7 +786,6 @@ ssh_engines_shutdown() {
+ 	while (buffer_len(&eng_list) > 0) {
+ 		u_int   k = 0;
+ 		char    *s;
+-		ENGINE  *e;
+ 
+ 		s = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&eng_list, &k);
+ 		ssh_engine_reset(s);
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 345d3df..0de30ad 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-	if (keyid > INT_MAX)
++	if (keyid32 > INT_MAX)
+ 		fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__);
+ 
+ 	keyid = keyid32; /*save cast*/
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index beb38a0..1cbda7e 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1459,7 +1459,9 @@ parse_int:
+ 
+ 	case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
+ 		charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
++# if 0
+ parse_keytypes:
++# endif
+ 		arg = strdelim(&s);
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index a540138..e77a344 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -1574,7 +1573,9 @@ parse_string:
+ 
+ 	case sHostKeyAlgorithms:
+ 		charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
++# if 0
+  parse_keytypes:
++#endif
+ 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index 50f04b7..3f9a7bf 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -273,21 +273,18 @@ pkcs11_dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+ /* openssl callback for freeing an EC key */
+ static void
+ pkcs11_ec_finish(EC_KEY *ec)
+ {
+ 	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
+ 
+-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+ 	k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ec, ssh_pkcs11_ec_ctx_index);
+ 	EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ssh_pkcs11_ec_ctx_index, NULL);
+-#else
+-	k11 = ECDSA_get_ex_data(ec, ssh_pkcs11_ec_ctx_index);
+-	ECDSA_set_ex_data(ec, ssh_pkcs11_ec_ctx_index, NULL);
+-#endif
+ 	pkcs11_key_free(k11);
+ }
++#endif /*def HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW*/
+ #endif /*def OPENSSL_HAS_ECC*/
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index fd2a70e..0960be1 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
+ {
+ 	/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+ 	if (compat20) {
+-		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s PKIX[%d]\r\n",
++		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s PKIX[%s]\r\n",
+ 		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, SSH_X509);
+ 	} else {
+ 		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.4_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.4_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ec2a6d894938
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.4_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/165444
+https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1008
+
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++	oGssTrustDns,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -194,9 +195,11 @@
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -930,6 +933,10 @@
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssTrustDns:
++		intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1649,6 +1656,7 @@
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1779,6 +1787,8 @@
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
+ 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+ 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
++	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -830,6 +830,16 @@
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -656,6 +656,13 @@
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int ok = 0;
++	const char *gss_host;
++
++	if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++		extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns);
++		gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
++	} else
++		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
+ 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ 	 * once. */
+@@ -668,7 +674,7 @@
+ 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ 		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+-		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host)) {
+ 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ 		} else {
+ 			mech++;
+
+need to move these two funcs back to canohost so they're available to clients
+and the server.  auth.c is only used in the server.
+
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -784,117 +784,3 @@ fakepw(void)
+ 
+ 	return (&fake);
+ }
+-
+-/*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+-	socklen_t fromlen;
+-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+-	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+-	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+-	/* Get IP address of client. */
+-	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+-	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+-	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+-	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+-		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+-		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+-	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+-	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+-	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+-		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+-	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+-	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+-	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+-		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+-		    name, ntop);
+-		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+-	lowercase(name);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+-	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+-	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+-	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+-	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+-	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+-	 * the domain).
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+-		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+-		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+-	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+-		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+-		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+-		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+-				break;
+-	}
+-	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+-	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+-	if (ai == NULL) {
+-		/* Address not found for the host name. */
+-		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+-		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	return strdup(name);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+- * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+- * several times.
+- */
+-
+-const char *
+-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+-{
+-	static char *dnsname;
+-
+-	if (!use_dns)
+-		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-	else if (dnsname != NULL)
+-		return dnsname;
+-	else {
+-		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-		return dnsname;
+-	}
+-}
+--- a/canohost.c
++++ b/canohost.c
+@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock)
+ {
+ 	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
++ * called.
++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
++ */
++
++static char *
++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct sockaddr_storage from;
++	socklen_t fromlen;
++	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
++	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
++	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++
++	/* Get IP address of client. */
++	fromlen = sizeof(from);
++	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
++	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
++	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
++		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
++	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
++		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
++
++	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
++	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
++	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
++	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
++		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
++	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
++	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
++	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
++		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
++		    name, ntop);
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
++	lowercase(name);
++
++	/*
++	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
++	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
++	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
++	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
++	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
++	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
++	 * the domain).
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
++		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
++		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
++	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
++		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
++		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
++		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
++				break;
++	}
++	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
++	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
++	if (ai == NULL) {
++		/* Address not found for the host name. */
++		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
++		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	return strdup(name);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
++ * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
++ * several times.
++ */
++
++const char *
++auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
++{
++	static char *dnsname;
++
++	if (!use_dns)
++		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++	else if (dnsname != NULL)
++		return dnsname;
++	else {
++		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
++		return dnsname;
++	}
++}
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.4_p1-test-bashism.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.4_p1-test-bashism.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3e02b6f8ccc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.4_p1-test-bashism.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2016-December/035604.html
+
+From dca2985bff146f756b0019b17f08c35f28841a04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
+Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 15:59:00 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] regress/allow-deny-users.sh: fix bashism in test
+
+The test command uses = for string compares, not ==.  Using some POSIX
+shells will reject this statement with an error about an unknown operator.
+---
+ regress/allow-deny-users.sh | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/regress/allow-deny-users.sh b/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
+index 32a269afa97c..86805e19322b 100644
+--- a/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
++++ b/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
+ tid="AllowUsers/DenyUsers"
+ 
+ me="$LOGNAME"
+-if [ "x$me" == "x" ]; then
++if [ "x$me" = "x" ]; then
+ 	me=`whoami`
+ fi
+ other="nobody"
+-- 
+2.11.0.rc2
+
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6b1e6dd35a41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/165444
+https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1008
+
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++	oGssTrustDns,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -194,9 +195,11 @@
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+ # else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ 	{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
+@@ -930,6 +933,10 @@
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssTrustDns:
++		intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1649,6 +1656,7 @@
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1779,6 +1787,8 @@
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
+ 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+ 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
++	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -830,6 +830,16 @@
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -656,6 +656,13 @@
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int ok = 0;
++	const char *gss_host;
++
++	if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++		extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns);
++		gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
++	} else
++		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
+ 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ 	 * once. */
+@@ -668,7 +674,7 @@
+ 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ 		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+-		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host)) {
+ 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ 		} else {
+ 			mech++;
+
+need to move these two funcs back to canohost so they're available to clients
+and the server.  auth.c is only used in the server.
+
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -784,117 +784,3 @@ fakepw(void)
+ 
+ 	return (&fake);
+ }
+-
+-/*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+-	socklen_t fromlen;
+-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+-	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+-	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+-	/* Get IP address of client. */
+-	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+-	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+-	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+-	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+-		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+-		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+-	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+-	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+-	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+-		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+-	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+-	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+-	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+-		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+-		    name, ntop);
+-		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+-	lowercase(name);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+-	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+-	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+-	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+-	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+-	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+-	 * the domain).
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+-		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+-		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+-	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+-		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+-		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+-		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+-				break;
+-	}
+-	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+-	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+-	if (ai == NULL) {
+-		/* Address not found for the host name. */
+-		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+-		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	return strdup(name);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+- * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+- * several times.
+- */
+-
+-const char *
+-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+-{
+-	static char *dnsname;
+-
+-	if (!use_dns)
+-		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-	else if (dnsname != NULL)
+-		return dnsname;
+-	else {
+-		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-		return dnsname;
+-	}
+-}
+--- a/canohost.c
++++ b/canohost.c
+@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock)
+ {
+ 	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
++ * called.
++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
++ */
++
++static char *
++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct sockaddr_storage from;
++	socklen_t fromlen;
++	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
++	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
++	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++
++	/* Get IP address of client. */
++	fromlen = sizeof(from);
++	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
++	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
++	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
++		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
++	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
++		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
++
++	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
++	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
++	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
++	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
++		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
++	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
++	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
++	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
++		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
++		    name, ntop);
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
++	lowercase(name);
++
++	/*
++	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
++	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
++	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
++	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
++	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
++	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
++	 * the domain).
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
++		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
++		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
++	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
++		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
++		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
++		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
++				break;
++	}
++	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
++	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
++	if (ai == NULL) {
++		/* Address not found for the host name. */
++		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
++		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	return strdup(name);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
++ * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
++ * several times.
++ */
++
++const char *
++auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
++{
++	static char *dnsname;
++
++	if (!use_dns)
++		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++	else if (dnsname != NULL)
++		return dnsname;
++	else {
++		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
++		return dnsname;
++	}
++}
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-cross-cache.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-cross-cache.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1c2b7b8a091a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-cross-cache.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From d588d6f83e9a3d48286929b4a705b43e74414241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 23:18:41 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] configure: actually set cache vars when cross-compiling
+
+The cross-compiling fallback message says it's assuming the test
+passed, but it didn't actually set the cache var which causes
+later tests to fail.
+---
+ configure.ac | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 5cfea38c0a6c..895c5211ea93 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3162,7 +3162,8 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	 select_works_with_rlimit=yes],
+ 	[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ 	 select_works_with_rlimit=no],
+-	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
++	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
++	 select_works_with_rlimit=yes]
+ )
+ 
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works])
+@@ -3188,7 +3189,8 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes],
+ 	[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ 	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no],
+-	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
++	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
++	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes]
+ )
+ 
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])
+-- 
+2.12.0
+
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-hpn-x509-10.1-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-hpn-x509-10.1-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e55a8b14c573
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-hpn-x509-10.1-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+diff -ur a/0003-Add-support-for-the-multi-threaded-AES-CTR-cipher.patch b/0003-Add-support-for-the-multi-threaded-AES-CTR-cipher.patch
+--- a/0003-Add-support-for-the-multi-threaded-AES-CTR-cipher.patch	2017-03-27 13:31:01.816551100 -0700
++++ b/0003-Add-support-for-the-multi-threaded-AES-CTR-cipher.patch	2017-03-27 13:51:03.894805846 -0700
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
+ @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ CC=@CC@
+  LD=@LD@
+  CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+- CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ -LIBS=@LIBS@
+ +LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread
+  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+@@ -1023,6 +1023,3 @@
+  	do_authenticated(authctxt);
+  
+  	/* The connection has been terminated. */
+--- 
+-2.12.0
+-
+diff -ur a/0004-support-dynamically-sized-receive-buffers.patch b/0004-support-dynamically-sized-receive-buffers.patch
+--- a/0004-support-dynamically-sized-receive-buffers.patch	2017-03-27 13:31:01.816551100 -0700
++++ b/0004-support-dynamically-sized-receive-buffers.patch	2017-03-27 13:49:44.513498976 -0700
+@@ -926,9 +926,9 @@
+ @@ -526,10 +553,10 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
+  	/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+  	if (compat20) {
+- 		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
+--		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
+-+		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
++		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s PKIX[%s]\r\n",
++-		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+++		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+  	} else {
+  		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
+ -		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
+@@ -943,11 +943,11 @@
+ @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
+  	char remote_version[256];	/* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+  
+- 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+--	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
+-+	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
++	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s%s",
++-	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION, comment,
+++	    major, minor, SSH_RELEASE, comment,
+  	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+- 	    options.version_addendum);
++ 	    options.version_addendum, newline);
+  
+ @@ -1020,6 +1020,8 @@ server_listen(void)
+  	int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
+@@ -1008,10 +1008,6 @@
+ @@ -3,4 +3,5 @@
+  #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_7.5"
+  
+- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+--#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
++-#define SSH_RELEASE	PACKAGE_STRING ", " SSH_VERSION "p1"
+ +#define SSH_HPN		"-hpn14v12"
+ +#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN
+--- 
+-2.12.0
+-
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-hpn-x509-10.2-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-hpn-x509-10.2-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..11a5b364be4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-hpn-x509-10.2-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+diff -ur a/0003-Add-support-for-the-multi-threaded-AES-CTR-cipher.patch b/0003-Add-support-for-the-multi-threaded-AES-CTR-cipher.patch
+--- a/0003-Add-support-for-the-multi-threaded-AES-CTR-cipher.patch	2017-03-27 13:31:01.816551100 -0700
++++ b/0003-Add-support-for-the-multi-threaded-AES-CTR-cipher.patch	2017-03-27 13:51:03.894805846 -0700
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
+ @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ CC=@CC@
+  LD=@LD@
+  CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+- CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ -LIBS=@LIBS@
+ +LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread
+  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+@@ -1023,6 +1023,3 @@
+  	do_authenticated(authctxt);
+  
+  	/* The connection has been terminated. */
+--- 
+-2.12.0
+-
+diff -ur a/0004-support-dynamically-sized-receive-buffers.patch b/0004-support-dynamically-sized-receive-buffers.patch
+--- a/0004-support-dynamically-sized-receive-buffers.patch	2017-03-27 13:31:01.816551100 -0700
++++ b/0004-support-dynamically-sized-receive-buffers.patch	2017-03-27 13:49:44.513498976 -0700
+@@ -926,9 +926,9 @@
+ @@ -526,10 +553,10 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
+  	/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+  	if (compat20) {
+- 		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
+--		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
+-+		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
++		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s PKIX[%s]\r\n",
++-		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+++		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+  	} else {
+  		xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
+ -		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
+@@ -943,11 +943,11 @@
+ @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
+  	char remote_version[256];	/* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+  
+- 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+--	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
+-+	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
++	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%s%s%s%s%s",
++-	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION, pkix_comment,
+++	    major, minor, SSH_RELEASE, pkix_comment,
+  	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+- 	    options.version_addendum);
++ 	    options.version_addendum, newline);
+  
+ @@ -1020,6 +1020,8 @@ server_listen(void)
+  	int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
+@@ -1006,12 +1008,9 @@
+ --- a/version.h
+ +++ b/version.h
+-@@ -3,4 +3,5 @@
++@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@
+  #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_7.5"
+  
+- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+--#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
++-#define SSH_RELEASE	PACKAGE_STRING ", " SSH_VERSION "p1"
+++#define SSH_X509	", PKIX-SSH " PACKAGE_VERSION
+ +#define SSH_HPN		"-hpn14v12"
+ +#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN
+--- 
+-2.12.0
+-
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-x32-typo.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-x32-typo.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5dca1b0e4e16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-x32-typo.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 596c432181e1c4a9da354388394f640afd29f44b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
+Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2017 14:57:40 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] seccomp sandbox: fix typo w/x32 check
+
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 3a1aedce72c2..a8d472a63ccb 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ 	 * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
+ 	 * https://bugs.debian.org/849923
+ 	 */
+-	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT);
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Default deny */
+-- 
+2.12.0
+
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5p1-x509-libressl.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5p1-x509-libressl.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b4f36a513180
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5p1-x509-libressl.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+diff -urN openssh-7.5p1.orig/a_utf8.c openssh-7.5p1/a_utf8.c
+--- openssh-7.5p1.orig/a_utf8.c	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ openssh-7.5p1/a_utf8.c	2017-03-30 17:38:25.179532110 +0000
+@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ *
++ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
++ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++ */
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++/* UTF8 utilities */
++
++/*-
++ * This parses a UTF8 string one character at a time. It is passed a pointer
++ * to the string and the length of the string. It sets 'value' to the value of
++ * the current character. It returns the number of characters read or a
++ * negative error code:
++ * -1 = string too short
++ * -2 = illegal character
++ * -3 = subsequent characters not of the form 10xxxxxx
++ * -4 = character encoded incorrectly (not minimal length).
++ */
++
++int UTF8_getc(const unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long *val)
++{
++    const unsigned char *p;
++    unsigned long value;
++    int ret;
++    if (len <= 0)
++        return 0;
++    p = str;
++
++    /* Check syntax and work out the encoded value (if correct) */
++    if ((*p & 0x80) == 0) {
++        value = *p++ & 0x7f;
++        ret = 1;
++    } else if ((*p & 0xe0) == 0xc0) {
++        if (len < 2)
++            return -1;
++        if ((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            return -3;
++        value = (*p++ & 0x1f) << 6;
++        value |= *p++ & 0x3f;
++        if (value < 0x80)
++            return -4;
++        ret = 2;
++    } else if ((*p & 0xf0) == 0xe0) {
++        if (len < 3)
++            return -1;
++        if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80))
++            return -3;
++        value = (*p++ & 0xf) << 12;
++        value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6;
++        value |= *p++ & 0x3f;
++        if (value < 0x800)
++            return -4;
++        ret = 3;
++    } else if ((*p & 0xf8) == 0xf0) {
++        if (len < 4)
++            return -1;
++        if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            || ((p[3] & 0xc0) != 0x80))
++            return -3;
++        value = ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x7)) << 18;
++        value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 12;
++        value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6;
++        value |= *p++ & 0x3f;
++        if (value < 0x10000)
++            return -4;
++        ret = 4;
++    } else if ((*p & 0xfc) == 0xf8) {
++        if (len < 5)
++            return -1;
++        if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            || ((p[3] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            || ((p[4] & 0xc0) != 0x80))
++            return -3;
++        value = ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3)) << 24;
++        value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 18;
++        value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 12;
++        value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6;
++        value |= *p++ & 0x3f;
++        if (value < 0x200000)
++            return -4;
++        ret = 5;
++    } else if ((*p & 0xfe) == 0xfc) {
++        if (len < 6)
++            return -1;
++        if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            || ((p[3] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            || ((p[4] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
++            || ((p[5] & 0xc0) != 0x80))
++            return -3;
++        value = ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x1)) << 30;
++        value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 24;
++        value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 18;
++        value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 12;
++        value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6;
++        value |= *p++ & 0x3f;
++        if (value < 0x4000000)
++            return -4;
++        ret = 6;
++    } else
++        return -2;
++    *val = value;
++    return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This takes a character 'value' and writes the UTF8 encoded value in 'str'
++ * where 'str' is a buffer containing 'len' characters. Returns the number of
++ * characters written or -1 if 'len' is too small. 'str' can be set to NULL
++ * in which case it just returns the number of characters. It will need at
++ * most 6 characters.
++ */
++
++int UTF8_putc(unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long value)
++{
++    if (!str)
++        len = 6;                /* Maximum we will need */
++    else if (len <= 0)
++        return -1;
++    if (value < 0x80) {
++        if (str)
++            *str = (unsigned char)value;
++        return 1;
++    }
++    if (value < 0x800) {
++        if (len < 2)
++            return -1;
++        if (str) {
++            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x1f) | 0xc0);
++            *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++        }
++        return 2;
++    }
++    if (value < 0x10000) {
++        if (len < 3)
++            return -1;
++        if (str) {
++            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0xf) | 0xe0);
++            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++            *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++        }
++        return 3;
++    }
++    if (value < 0x200000) {
++        if (len < 4)
++            return -1;
++        if (str) {
++            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 18) & 0x7) | 0xf0);
++            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++            *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++        }
++        return 4;
++    }
++    if (value < 0x4000000) {
++        if (len < 5)
++            return -1;
++        if (str) {
++            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 24) & 0x3) | 0xf8);
++            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 18) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++            *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++            *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++        }
++        return 5;
++    }
++    if (len < 6)
++        return -1;
++    if (str) {
++        *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 30) & 0x1) | 0xfc);
++        *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 24) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++        *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 18) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++        *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++        *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++        *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80);
++    }
++    return 6;
++}
+diff -urN openssh-7.5p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-7.5p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.5p1.orig/Makefile.in	2017-03-30 17:33:30.983830629 +0000
++++ openssh-7.5p1/Makefile.in	2017-03-30 17:39:28.392905858 +0000
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
+ @OCSP_ON@OCSP_OBJS=ssh-ocsp.o
+ @OCSP_OFF@OCSP_OBJS=
+ 
+-SSHX509_OBJS=ssh-x509.o ssh-xkalg.o x509_nm_cmp.o key-eng.o
++SSHX509_OBJS=ssh-x509.o ssh-xkalg.o x509_nm_cmp.o key-eng.o a_utf8.o
+ X509STORE_OBJS=x509store.o $(LDAP_OBJS)
+ 
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.confd b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.confd
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..28952b4a285a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.confd
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# /etc/conf.d/sshd: config file for /etc/init.d/sshd
+
+# Where is your sshd_config file stored?
+
+SSHD_CONFDIR="/etc/ssh"
+
+
+# Any random options you want to pass to sshd.
+# See the sshd(8) manpage for more info.
+
+SSHD_OPTS=""
+
+
+# Pid file to use (needs to be absolute path).
+
+#SSHD_PIDFILE="/var/run/sshd.pid"
+
+
+# Path to the sshd binary (needs to be absolute path).
+
+#SSHD_BINARY="/usr/sbin/sshd"
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.pam_include.2 b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.pam_include.2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b801aaafa0f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.pam_include.2
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+auth       include	system-remote-login
+account    include	system-remote-login
+password   include	system-remote-login
+session	   include	system-remote-login
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.4 b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.4
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5e301420361f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.4
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#!/sbin/openrc-run
+# Copyright 1999-2015 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+extra_commands="checkconfig"
+extra_started_commands="reload"
+
+: ${SSHD_CONFDIR:=/etc/ssh}
+: ${SSHD_CONFIG:=${SSHD_CONFDIR}/sshd_config}
+: ${SSHD_PIDFILE:=/var/run/${SVCNAME}.pid}
+: ${SSHD_BINARY:=/usr/sbin/sshd}
+
+depend() {
+	use logger dns
+	if [ "${rc_need+set}" = "set" ] ; then
+		: # Do nothing, the user has explicitly set rc_need
+	else
+		local x warn_addr
+		for x in $(awk '/^ListenAddress/{ print $2 }' "$SSHD_CONFIG" 2>/dev/null) ; do
+			case "${x}" in
+				0.0.0.0|0.0.0.0:*) ;;
+				::|\[::\]*) ;;
+				*) warn_addr="${warn_addr} ${x}" ;;
+			esac
+		done
+		if [ -n "${warn_addr}" ] ; then
+			need net
+			ewarn "You are binding an interface in ListenAddress statement in your sshd_config!"
+			ewarn "You must add rc_need=\"net.FOO\" to your /etc/conf.d/sshd"
+			ewarn "where FOO is the interface(s) providing the following address(es):"
+			ewarn "${warn_addr}"
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+checkconfig() {
+	if [ ! -d /var/empty ] ; then
+		mkdir -p /var/empty || return 1
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -e "${SSHD_CONFIG}" ] ; then
+		eerror "You need an ${SSHD_CONFIG} file to run sshd"
+		eerror "There is a sample file in /usr/share/doc/openssh"
+		return 1
+	fi
+
+	ssh-keygen -A || return 1
+
+	[ "${SSHD_PIDFILE}" != "/var/run/sshd.pid" ] \
+		&& SSHD_OPTS="${SSHD_OPTS} -o PidFile=${SSHD_PIDFILE}"
+	[ "${SSHD_CONFIG}" != "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] \
+		&& SSHD_OPTS="${SSHD_OPTS} -f ${SSHD_CONFIG}"
+
+	"${SSHD_BINARY}" -t ${SSHD_OPTS} || return 1
+}
+
+start() {
+	checkconfig || return 1
+
+	ebegin "Starting ${SVCNAME}"
+	start-stop-daemon --start --exec "${SSHD_BINARY}" \
+	    --pidfile "${SSHD_PIDFILE}" \
+	    -- ${SSHD_OPTS}
+	eend $?
+}
+
+stop() {
+	if [ "${RC_CMD}" = "restart" ] ; then
+		checkconfig || return 1
+	fi
+
+	ebegin "Stopping ${SVCNAME}"
+	start-stop-daemon --stop --exec "${SSHD_BINARY}" \
+	    --pidfile "${SSHD_PIDFILE}" --quiet
+	eend $?
+}
+
+reload() {
+	checkconfig || return 1
+	ebegin "Reloading ${SVCNAME}"
+	start-stop-daemon --signal HUP \
+	    --exec "${SSHD_BINARY}" --pidfile "${SSHD_PIDFILE}"
+	eend $?
+}
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.service b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.service
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b5e96b3a251f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.service
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
+After=syslog.target network.target auditd.service
+
+[Service]
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D -e
+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.socket b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.socket
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..94b9533180da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.socket
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH Server Socket
+Conflicts=sshd.service
+
+[Socket]
+ListenStream=22
+Accept=yes
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sockets.target
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd_at.service b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd_at.service
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2645ad047cc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd_at.service
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon
+After=syslog.target auditd.service
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i -e
+StandardInput=socket
+StandardError=syslog