path: root/net-vpn/tor/files/tor-0.4.7.16-arm64-sandbox.patch

From https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/merge_requests/574
Gentoo Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/920063
From: Pierre Bourdon <delroth@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 11:52:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] sandbox: fix openat filtering on AArch64

New glibc versions not sign-extending 32 bit negative constants seems to
not be a thing on AArch64. I suspect that this might not be the only
architecture where the sign-extensions is happening, and the correct fix
might be instead to use a proper 32 bit comparison for the first openat
parameter. For now, band-aid fix this so the sandbox can work again on
AArch64.
--- a/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c
+++ b/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c
@@ -518,7 +518,12 @@ libc_uses_openat_for_opendir(void)
 static int
 libc_negative_constant_needs_cast(void)
 {
+#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__LP64__)
+  /* Existing glibc versions always sign-extend to 64 bits on AArch64. */
+  return 0;
+#else
   return is_libc_at_least(2, 27);
+#endif
 }
 
 /** Allow a single file to be opened.  If <b>use_openat</b> is true,
-- 
GitLab


From 8fd13f7a7bfd4efc02d888ce9d10bcb6a80a03c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pierre Bourdon <delroth@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 13:02:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] sandbox: filter {chown,chmod,rename} via their *at
 variant on Aarch64

The chown/chmod/rename syscalls have never existed on AArch64, and libc
implements the POSIX functions via the fchownat/fchmodat/renameat
syscalls instead.

Add new filter functions for fchownat/fchmodat/renameat, not made
architecture specific since the syscalls exists everywhere else too.
However, in order to limit seccomp filter space usage, we only insert
rules for one of {chown, chown32, fchownat} depending on the
architecture (resp. {chmod, fchmodat}, {rename, renameat}).
--- a/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c
+++ b/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c
@@ -614,6 +614,32 @@ sb_chmod(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
   return 0;
 }
 
+static int
+sb_fchmodat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
+{
+  int rc;
+  sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
+
+  // for each dynamic parameter filters
+  for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
+    smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
+
+    if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
+        == SCMP_SYS(fchmodat)) {
+      rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fchmodat),
+          SCMP_CMP_NEG(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
+          SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
+      if (rc != 0) {
+        log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add fchmodat syscall, received "
+            "libseccomp error %d", rc);
+        return rc;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
 #ifdef __i386__
 static int
 sb_chown32(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
@@ -666,6 +692,32 @@ sb_chown(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
 }
 #endif /* defined(__i386__) */
 
+static int
+sb_fchownat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
+{
+  int rc;
+  sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
+
+  // for each dynamic parameter filters
+  for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
+    smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
+
+    if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
+        == SCMP_SYS(fchownat)) {
+      rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fchownat),
+          SCMP_CMP_NEG(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
+          SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
+      if (rc != 0) {
+        log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add fchownat syscall, received "
+            "libseccomp error %d", rc);
+        return rc;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * Function responsible for setting up the rename syscall for
  * the seccomp filter sandbox.
@@ -697,6 +749,39 @@ sb_rename(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
   return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Function responsible for setting up the renameat syscall for
+ * the seccomp filter sandbox.
+ */
+static int
+sb_renameat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
+{
+  int rc;
+  sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
+
+  // for each dynamic parameter filters
+  for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
+    smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
+
+    if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 &&
+        param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(renameat)) {
+
+      rc = seccomp_rule_add_4(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(renameat),
+            SCMP_CMP_NEG(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
+            SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
+            SCMP_CMP_NEG(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
+            SCMP_CMP_STR(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value2));
+      if (rc != 0) {
+        log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add renameat syscall, received "
+            "libseccomp error %d", rc);
+        return rc;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * Function responsible for setting up the openat syscall for
  * the seccomp filter sandbox.
@@ -1317,7 +1402,9 @@ static sandbox_filter_func_t filter_func[] = {
 #else
     sb_chown,
 #endif
+    sb_fchownat,
     sb_chmod,
+    sb_fchmodat,
     sb_open,
     sb_openat,
     sb_opendir,
@@ -1325,6 +1412,7 @@ static sandbox_filter_func_t filter_func[] = {
     sb_ptrace,
 #endif
     sb_rename,
+    sb_renameat,
 #ifdef __NR_fcntl64
     sb_fcntl64,
 #endif
@@ -1592,10 +1680,24 @@ new_element(int syscall, char *value)
 
 #ifdef __i386__
 #define SCMP_chown SCMP_SYS(chown32)
+#elif defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__LP64__)
+#define SCMP_chown SCMP_SYS(fchownat)
 #else
 #define SCMP_chown SCMP_SYS(chown)
 #endif
 
+#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__LP64__)
+#define SCMP_chmod SCMP_SYS(fchmodat)
+#else
+#define SCMP_chmod SCMP_SYS(chmod)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__LP64__)
+#define SCMP_rename SCMP_SYS(renameat)
+#else
+#define SCMP_rename SCMP_SYS(rename)
+#endif
+
 #ifdef __NR_stat64
 #define SCMP_stat SCMP_SYS(stat64)
 #else
@@ -1633,7 +1735,7 @@ sandbox_cfg_allow_chmod_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
 {
   sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
 
-  elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(chmod), file);
+  elem = new_element(SCMP_chmod, file);
 
   elem->next = *cfg;
   *cfg = elem;
@@ -1659,7 +1761,7 @@ sandbox_cfg_allow_rename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file1, char *file2)
 {
   sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
 
-  elem = new_element2(SCMP_SYS(rename), file1, file2);
+  elem = new_element2(SCMP_rename, file1, file2);
 
   elem->next = *cfg;
   *cfg = elem;
-- 
GitLab


From eb0749d64917fee6ff74c3810dbec8cd063f546c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pierre Bourdon <delroth@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 07:19:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] sandbox: replace SCMP_CMP_NEG with masked equality checks

For some syscalls the kernel ABI uses 32 bit signed integers. Whether
these 32 bit integer values are sign extended or zero extended to the
native 64 bit register sizes is undefined and dependent on the {arch,
compiler, libc} being used. Instead of trying to detect which cases
zero-extend and which cases sign-extend, this commit uses a masked
equality check on the lower 32 bits of the value.
--- a/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c
+++ b/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c
@@ -141,10 +141,12 @@ static sandbox_cfg_t *filter_dynamic = NULL;
  * the high bits of the value might get masked out improperly. */
 #define SCMP_CMP_MASKED(a,b,c) \
   SCMP_CMP4((a), SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, ~(scmp_datum_t)(b), (c))
-/* For negative constants, the rule to add depends on the glibc version. */
-#define SCMP_CMP_NEG(a,op,b) (libc_negative_constant_needs_cast() ? \
-                              (SCMP_CMP((a), (op), (unsigned int)(b))) : \
-                              (SCMP_CMP_STR((a), (op), (b))))
+/* Negative constants aren't consistently sign extended or zero extended.
+ * Different compilers, libc, and architectures behave differently. For cases
+ * where the kernel ABI uses a 32 bit integer, this macro can be used to
+ * mask-compare only the lower 32 bits of the value. */
+#define SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(a,b) \
+  SCMP_CMP4((a), SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFF, (unsigned int)(b))
 
 /** Variable used for storing all syscall numbers that will be allowed with the
  * stage 1 general Tor sandbox.
@@ -513,19 +515,6 @@ libc_uses_openat_for_opendir(void)
          (is_libc_at_least(2, 15) && !is_libc_at_least(2, 22));
 }
 
-/* Return true if we think we're running with a libc that needs to cast
- * negative arguments like AT_FDCWD for seccomp rules. */
-static int
-libc_negative_constant_needs_cast(void)
-{
-#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__LP64__)
-  /* Existing glibc versions always sign-extend to 64 bits on AArch64. */
-  return 0;
-#else
-  return is_libc_at_least(2, 27);
-#endif
-}
-
 /** Allow a single file to be opened.  If <b>use_openat</b> is true,
  * we're using a libc that remaps all the opens into openats. */
 static int
@@ -533,7 +522,7 @@ allow_file_open(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, int use_openat, const char *file)
 {
   if (use_openat) {
     return seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat),
-                              SCMP_CMP_NEG(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
+                              SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(0, AT_FDCWD),
                               SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, file));
   } else {
     return seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(open),
@@ -627,7 +616,7 @@ sb_fchmodat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
     if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
         == SCMP_SYS(fchmodat)) {
       rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fchmodat),
-          SCMP_CMP_NEG(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
+          SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(0, AT_FDCWD),
           SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
       if (rc != 0) {
         log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add fchmodat syscall, received "
@@ -705,7 +694,7 @@ sb_fchownat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
     if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
         == SCMP_SYS(fchownat)) {
       rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fchownat),
-          SCMP_CMP_NEG(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
+          SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(0, AT_FDCWD),
           SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
       if (rc != 0) {
         log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add fchownat syscall, received "
@@ -767,9 +756,9 @@ sb_renameat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
         param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(renameat)) {
 
       rc = seccomp_rule_add_4(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(renameat),
-            SCMP_CMP_NEG(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
+            SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(0, AT_FDCWD),
             SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
-            SCMP_CMP_NEG(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
+            SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(2, AT_FDCWD),
             SCMP_CMP_STR(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value2));
       if (rc != 0) {
         log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add renameat syscall, received "
@@ -799,7 +788,7 @@ sb_openat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
     if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
         == SCMP_SYS(openat)) {
       rc = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat),
-          SCMP_CMP_NEG(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
+          SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(0, AT_FDCWD),
           SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
           SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE|O_DIRECTORY|
               O_CLOEXEC));
-- 
GitLab


From 42034ae9da2866c67ce8cb8522d6a619d8b21170 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pierre Bourdon <delroth@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 07:31:06 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] changes: add entry for MR !574

--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/aarch64_sandbox
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+  o Minor bugfixes (sandbox):
+    - Fix sandbox support on AArch64 systems. More "*at" variants of syscalls
+      are now supported. Signed 32 bit syscall parameters are checked more
+      precisely, which should lead to lower likelihood of breakages with future
+      compiler and libc releases. Fixes bug 40599; bugfix on 0.4.4.3-alpha.
-- 
GitLab