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https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20240408.txt
https://bugs.gentoo.org/930047
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7e4d731b1c07201ad9374c1cd9ac5263bdf35bce
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c342f4b8bd2d0b375b0e22337057c2eab47d9b96

From 7e4d731b1c07201ad9374c1cd9ac5263bdf35bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3

In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send.
We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in
use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if
early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being
used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session
simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads,
then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we
duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the
new session object. The new session object is then added to the session
cache even though it is not_resumable.

Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for
sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is
still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from
the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the
cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely.

CVE-2024-2511

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044)
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -3737,9 +3737,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
 
     /*
      * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
-     * would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
+     * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already
+     * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse.
      */
-    if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
+    if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable)
         return;
 
     /*
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -154,16 +154,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
     return ss;
 }
 
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src)
-{
-    return ssl_session_dup(src, 1);
-}
-
 /*
  * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
  * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
  */
-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
 {
     SSL_SESSION *dest;
 
@@ -287,6 +282,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
     return NULL;
 }
 
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src)
+{
+    return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared.
+ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked
+ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to
+ * resume from.
+ */
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket);
+
+    if (sess != NULL)
+        sess->not_resumable = 0;
+
+    return sess;
+}
+
 const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
 {
     if (len)
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
@@ -2338,9 +2338,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
      * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
      * to send back.
      */
-    if (s->session->not_resumable ||
-        (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
-         && !s->hit))
+    if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+            && !s->hit)
         s->session->session_id_length = 0;
 
     if (usetls13) {

From c342f4b8bd2d0b375b0e22337057c2eab47d9b96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 17:58:42 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Hardening around not_resumable sessions

Make sure we can't inadvertently use a not_resumable session

Related to CVE-2024-2511

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044)
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -533,6 +533,12 @@ SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id,
         ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, sess_id, sess_id_len, &copy);
 
         if (ret != NULL) {
+            if (ret->not_resumable) {
+                /* If its not resumable then ignore this session */
+                if (!copy)
+                    SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+                return NULL;
+            }
             ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
                              &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);