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-rw-r--r--sys-apps/systemd/files/242-rdrand-ryzen.patch353
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 353 deletions
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-rdrand-ryzen.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-rdrand-ryzen.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ec690c1b3f6c..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-rdrand-ryzen.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
-From d351699739471734666230ae3c6f9ba56ce5ce45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 16:18:13 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] =?UTF-8?q?random-util:=20rename=20RANDOM=5FDONT=5FDRA?=
- =?UTF-8?q?IN=20=E2=86=92=20RANDOM=5FMAY=5FFAIL?=
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The old flag name was a bit of a misnomer, as /dev/urandom cannot be
-"drained". Once it's initialized it's initialized and then is good
-forever. (Only /dev/random has a concept of 'draining', but we never use
-that, as it's an obsolete interface).
-
-The flag is still useful though, since it allows us to suppress accesses
-to the random pool while it is not initialized, as that trips up the
-kernel and it logs about any such attempts, which we really don't want.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 1a0ffa1e737e65312abac63dcf4b44e1ac0e1642)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- src/basic/random-util.h | 4 ++--
- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index ca25fd2420..de29e07549 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -71,21 +71,22 @@ int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags) {
- bool got_some = false;
- int r;
-
-- /* Gathers some randomness from the kernel (or the CPU if the RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND flag is set). This call won't
-- * block, unless the RANDOM_BLOCK flag is set. If RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN is set, an error is returned if the random
-- * pool is not initialized. Otherwise it will always return some data from the kernel, regardless of whether
-- * the random pool is fully initialized or not. */
-+ /* Gathers some randomness from the kernel (or the CPU if the RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND flag is set). This
-+ * call won't block, unless the RANDOM_BLOCK flag is set. If RANDOM_MAY_FAIL is set, an error is
-+ * returned if the random pool is not initialized. Otherwise it will always return some data from the
-+ * kernel, regardless of whether the random pool is fully initialized or not. */
-
- if (n == 0)
- return 0;
-
- if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND))
-- /* Try x86-64' RDRAND intrinsic if we have it. We only use it if high quality randomness is not
-- * required, as we don't trust it (who does?). Note that we only do a single iteration of RDRAND here,
-- * even though the Intel docs suggest calling this in a tight loop of 10 invocations or so. That's
-- * because we don't really care about the quality here. We generally prefer using RDRAND if the caller
-- * allows us too, since this way we won't drain the kernel randomness pool if we don't need it, as the
-- * pool's entropy is scarce. */
-+ /* Try x86-64' RDRAND intrinsic if we have it. We only use it if high quality randomness is
-+ * not required, as we don't trust it (who does?). Note that we only do a single iteration of
-+ * RDRAND here, even though the Intel docs suggest calling this in a tight loop of 10
-+ * invocations or so. That's because we don't really care about the quality here. We
-+ * generally prefer using RDRAND if the caller allows us to, since this way we won't upset
-+ * the kernel's random subsystem by accessing it before the pool is initialized (after all it
-+ * will kmsg log about every attempt to do so)..*/
- for (;;) {
- unsigned long u;
- size_t m;
-@@ -153,12 +154,13 @@ int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags) {
- break;
-
- } else if (errno == EAGAIN) {
-- /* The kernel has no entropy whatsoever. Let's remember to use the syscall the next
-- * time again though.
-+ /* The kernel has no entropy whatsoever. Let's remember to use the syscall
-+ * the next time again though.
- *
-- * If RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN is set, return an error so that random_bytes() can produce some
-- * pseudo-random bytes instead. Otherwise, fall back to /dev/urandom, which we know is empty,
-- * but the kernel will produce some bytes for us on a best-effort basis. */
-+ * If RANDOM_MAY_FAIL is set, return an error so that random_bytes() can
-+ * produce some pseudo-random bytes instead. Otherwise, fall back to
-+ * /dev/urandom, which we know is empty, but the kernel will produce some
-+ * bytes for us on a best-effort basis. */
- have_syscall = true;
-
- if (got_some && FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO)) {
-@@ -167,7 +169,7 @@ int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags) {
- return 0;
- }
-
-- if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN))
-+ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_MAY_FAIL))
- return -ENODATA;
-
- /* Use /dev/urandom instead */
-@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ void pseudo_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n) {
-
- void random_bytes(void *p, size_t n) {
-
-- if (genuine_random_bytes(p, n, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO|RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN|RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND) >= 0)
-+ if (genuine_random_bytes(p, n, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO|RANDOM_MAY_FAIL|RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND) >= 0)
- return;
-
- /* If for some reason some user made /dev/urandom unavailable to us, or the kernel has no entropy, use a PRNG instead. */
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.h b/src/basic/random-util.h
-index 3e8c288d3d..148b6c7813 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.h
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.h
-@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@
- typedef enum RandomFlags {
- RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO = 1 << 0, /* If we can't get enough genuine randomness, but some, fill up the rest with pseudo-randomness */
- RANDOM_BLOCK = 1 << 1, /* Rather block than return crap randomness (only if the kernel supports that) */
-- RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN = 1 << 2, /* If we can't get any randomness at all, return early with -EAGAIN */
-+ RANDOM_MAY_FAIL = 1 << 2, /* If we can't get any randomness at all, return early with -ENODATA */
- RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND = 1 << 3, /* Allow usage of the CPU RNG */
- } RandomFlags;
-
--int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags); /* returns "genuine" randomness, optionally filled upwith pseudo random, if not enough is available */
-+int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags); /* returns "genuine" randomness, optionally filled up with pseudo random, if not enough is available */
- void pseudo_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n); /* returns only pseudo-randommess (but possibly seeded from something better) */
- void random_bytes(void *p, size_t n); /* returns genuine randomness if cheaply available, and pseudo randomness if not. */
-
---
-2.22.0
-
-
-From 1f492b9ecc31aa3782f9ce82058d8fb72a5c323f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 16:21:44 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] random-util: use gcc's bit_RDRND definition if it exists
-
-(cherry picked from commit cc28145d51f62711fdc4b4c229aecd5778806419)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index de29e07549..205d5501e5 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- }
-
-- have_rdrand = !!(ecx & (1U << 30));
-+/* Compat with old gcc where bit_RDRND didn't exist yet */
-+#ifndef bit_RDRND
-+#define bit_RDRND (1U << 30)
-+#endif
-+
-+ have_rdrand = !!(ecx & bit_RDRND);
- }
-
- if (have_rdrand == 0)
---
-2.22.0
-
-
-From 6460c540e6183dd19de89b7f0672b3b47c4d41cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 17:26:55 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] random-util: hash AT_RANDOM getauxval() value before
- using it
-
-Let's be a bit paranoid and hash the 16 bytes we get from getauxval()
-before using them. AFter all they might be used by other stuff too (in
-particular ASLR), and we probably shouldn't end up leaking that seed
-though our crappy pseudo-random numbers.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 80eb560a5bd7439103036867d5e09a5e0393e5d3)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index 205d5501e5..40f1928936 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- #include "io-util.h"
- #include "missing.h"
- #include "random-util.h"
-+#include "siphash24.h"
- #include "time-util.h"
-
- int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
-@@ -203,14 +204,19 @@ void initialize_srand(void) {
- return;
-
- #if HAVE_SYS_AUXV_H
-- /* The kernel provides us with 16 bytes of entropy in auxv, so let's
-- * try to make use of that to seed the pseudo-random generator. It's
-- * better than nothing... */
-+ /* The kernel provides us with 16 bytes of entropy in auxv, so let's try to make use of that to seed
-+ * the pseudo-random generator. It's better than nothing... But let's first hash it to make it harder
-+ * to recover the original value by watching any pseudo-random bits we generate. After all the
-+ * AT_RANDOM data might be used by other stuff too (in particular: ASLR), and we probably shouldn't
-+ * leak the seed for that. */
-
-- auxv = (const void*) getauxval(AT_RANDOM);
-+ auxv = ULONG_TO_PTR(getauxval(AT_RANDOM));
- if (auxv) {
-- assert_cc(sizeof(x) <= 16);
-- memcpy(&x, auxv, sizeof(x));
-+ static const uint8_t auxval_hash_key[16] = {
-+ 0x92, 0x6e, 0xfe, 0x1b, 0xcf, 0x00, 0x52, 0x9c, 0xcc, 0x42, 0xcf, 0xdc, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x81, 0x0f
-+ };
-+
-+ x = (unsigned) siphash24(auxv, 16, auxval_hash_key);
- } else
- #endif
- x = 0;
---
-2.22.0
-
-
-From 17d52f6320b45d1728af6007b4df4aaccc6fdaf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 18:51:26 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] random-util: rename "err" to "success"
-
-After all rdrand returns 1 on success, and 0 on failure, hence let's
-name this accordingly.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 328f850e36e86d14ab06d11fa8f2397e9575a7f9)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index 40f1928936..7c64857592 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
-
- #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
- static int have_rdrand = -1;
-- unsigned char err;
-+ uint8_t success;
-
- if (have_rdrand < 0) {
- uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
-@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
- asm volatile("rdrand %0;"
- "setc %1"
- : "=r" (*ret),
-- "=qm" (err));
-- msan_unpoison(&err, sizeof(err));
-- if (!err)
-+ "=qm" (success));
-+ msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(sucess));
-+ if (!success)
- return -EAGAIN;
-
- return 0;
---
-2.22.0
-
-
-From a6c72245ba5ba688cd6544650b9c6e313b39b53e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Evgeny Vereshchagin <evvers@ya.ru>
-Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 15:50:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] util-lib: fix a typo in rdrand
-
-Otherwise, the fuzzers will fail to compile with MSan:
-```
-../../src/systemd/src/basic/random-util.c:64:40: error: use of undeclared identifier 'sucess'; did you mean 'success'?
- msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(sucess));
- ^~~~~~
- success
-../../src/systemd/src/basic/alloc-util.h:169:50: note: expanded from macro 'msan_unpoison'
- ^
-../../src/systemd/src/basic/random-util.c:38:17: note: 'success' declared here
- uint8_t success;
- ^
-1 error generated.
-[80/545] Compiling C object 'src/basic/a6ba3eb@@basic@sta/process-util.c.o'.
-ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed.
-Fuzzers build failed
-```
-
-(cherry picked from commit 7f2cdceaed4d37c4e601e531c7d863fca1bd1460)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index 7c64857592..b8bbf2d418 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
- "setc %1"
- : "=r" (*ret),
- "=qm" (success));
-- msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(sucess));
-+ msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(success));
- if (!success)
- return -EAGAIN;
-
---
-2.22.0
-
-
-From 47eec0ae61c887cb8cc05ce8d49b8d151bc4ef25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Fri, 10 May 2019 15:16:16 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] random-util: eat up bad RDRAND values seen on AMD CPUs
-
-An ugly, ugly work-around for #11810. And no, we shouldn't have to do
-this. This is something for AMD, the firmware or the kernel to
-fix/work-around, not us. But nonetheless, this should do it for now.
-
-Fixes: #11810
-(cherry picked from commit 1c53d4a070edbec8ad2d384ba0014d0eb6bae077)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index b8bbf2d418..0561f0cb22 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
-
- #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
- static int have_rdrand = -1;
-+ unsigned long v;
- uint8_t success;
-
- if (have_rdrand < 0) {
-@@ -59,12 +60,24 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
-
- asm volatile("rdrand %0;"
- "setc %1"
-- : "=r" (*ret),
-+ : "=r" (v),
- "=qm" (success));
- msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(success));
- if (!success)
- return -EAGAIN;
-
-+ /* Apparently on some AMD CPUs RDRAND will sometimes (after a suspend/resume cycle?) report success
-+ * via the carry flag but nonetheless return the same fixed value -1 in all cases. This appears to be
-+ * a bad bug in the CPU or firmware. Let's deal with that and work-around this by explicitly checking
-+ * for this special value (and also 0, just to be sure) and filtering it out. This is a work-around
-+ * only however and something AMD really should fix properly. The Linux kernel should probably work
-+ * around this issue by turning off RDRAND altogether on those CPUs. See:
-+ * https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/11810 */
-+ if (v == 0 || v == ULONG_MAX)
-+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN),
-+ "RDRAND returned suspicious value %lx, assuming bad hardware RNG, not using value.", v);
-+
-+ *ret = v;
- return 0;
- #else
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
---
-2.22.0
-