summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch')
-rw-r--r--net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch254
1 files changed, 254 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c9973f214fc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/5781341d99cd286a1f3d164e0576c2e837a444b7
+
+--- a/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
++++ b/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c
+@@ -46,11 +46,12 @@
+ #include <config.h>
+ #endif
+
+-#include "hmac.h"
++#include "auth.h"
+ #include "alloc.h"
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+-#define HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX 20
++#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+
+ /* the debug module for authentiation */
+
+@@ -65,26 +66,18 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
+ {
+ extern auth_type_t hmac;
+ uint8_t *pointer;
+- hmac_ctx_t *new_hmac_ctx;
++ HMAC_CTX *new_hmac_ctx;
+
+ debug_print(mod_hmac, "allocating auth func with key length %d", key_len);
+ debug_print(mod_hmac, " tag length %d", out_len);
+
+- /*
+- * check key length - note that we don't support keys larger
+- * than 20 bytes yet
+- */
+- if (key_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
+- return err_status_bad_param;
+- }
+-
+ /* check output length - should be less than 20 bytes */
+- if (out_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
++ if (out_len > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+ return err_status_bad_param;
+ }
+
+- /* allocate memory for auth and hmac_ctx_t structures */
+- pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(hmac_ctx_t) + sizeof(auth_t));
++ /* allocate memory for auth and HMAC_CTX structures */
++ pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
+ if (pointer == NULL) {
+ return err_status_alloc_fail;
+ }
+@@ -96,8 +89,8 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
+ (*a)->out_len = out_len;
+ (*a)->key_len = key_len;
+ (*a)->prefix_len = 0;
+- new_hmac_ctx = (hmac_ctx_t*)((*a)->state);
+- memset(new_hmac_ctx, 0, sizeof(hmac_ctx_t));
++ new_hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)((*a)->state);
++ HMAC_CTX_init(new_hmac_ctx);
+
+ /* increment global count of all hmac uses */
+ hmac.ref_count++;
+@@ -109,19 +102,15 @@ err_status_t
+ hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a)
+ {
+ extern auth_type_t hmac;
+- hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx;
++ HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
+
+- hmac_ctx = (hmac_ctx_t*)a->state;
+- if (hmac_ctx->ctx_initialized) {
+- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx->ctx);
+- }
+- if (hmac_ctx->init_ctx_initialized) {
+- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx->init_ctx);
+- }
++ hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)a->state;
+
++ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmac_ctx);
++
+ /* zeroize entire state*/
+ octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a,
+- sizeof(hmac_ctx_t) + sizeof(auth_t));
++ sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
+
+ /* free memory */
+ crypto_free(a);
+@@ -133,113 +122,65 @@ hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a)
+ }
+
+ err_status_t
+-hmac_init (hmac_ctx_t *state, const uint8_t *key, int key_len)
++hmac_init (HMAC_CTX *state, const uint8_t *key, int key_len)
+ {
+- int i;
+- uint8_t ipad[64];
++ if (HMAC_Init_ex(state, key, key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL) == 0)
++ return err_status_auth_fail;
+
+- /*
+- * check key length - note that we don't support keys larger
+- * than 20 bytes yet
+- */
+- if (key_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
+- return err_status_bad_param;
+- }
+-
+- /*
+- * set values of ipad and opad by exoring the key into the
+- * appropriate constant values
+- */
+- for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++) {
+- ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
+- state->opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
+- }
+- /* set the rest of ipad, opad to constant values */
+- for (; i < sizeof(ipad); i++) {
+- ipad[i] = 0x36;
+- ((uint8_t*)state->opad)[i] = 0x5c;
+- }
+-
+- debug_print(mod_hmac, "ipad: %s", octet_string_hex_string(ipad, sizeof(ipad)));
+-
+- /* initialize sha1 context */
+- sha1_init(&state->init_ctx);
+- state->init_ctx_initialized = 1;
+-
+- /* hash ipad ^ key */
+- sha1_update(&state->init_ctx, ipad, sizeof(ipad));
+- return (hmac_start(state));
++ return err_status_ok;
+ }
+
+ err_status_t
+-hmac_start (hmac_ctx_t *state)
++hmac_start (HMAC_CTX *state)
+ {
+- if (state->ctx_initialized) {
+- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&state->ctx);
+- }
+- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&state->ctx, &state->init_ctx)) {
++ if (HMAC_Init_ex(state, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) == 0)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
+- } else {
+- state->ctx_initialized = 1;
+- return err_status_ok;
+- }
++
++ return err_status_ok;
+ }
+
+ err_status_t
+-hmac_update (hmac_ctx_t *state, const uint8_t *message, int msg_octets)
++hmac_update (HMAC_CTX *state, const uint8_t *message, int msg_octets)
+ {
+ debug_print(mod_hmac, "input: %s",
+ octet_string_hex_string(message, msg_octets));
+
+- /* hash message into sha1 context */
+- sha1_update(&state->ctx, message, msg_octets);
++ if (HMAC_Update(state, message, msg_octets) == 0)
++ return err_status_auth_fail;
+
+ return err_status_ok;
+ }
+
+ err_status_t
+-hmac_compute (hmac_ctx_t *state, const void *message,
++hmac_compute (HMAC_CTX *state, const void *message,
+ int msg_octets, int tag_len, uint8_t *result)
+ {
+- uint32_t hash_value[5];
+- uint32_t H[5];
++ uint8_t hash_value[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ int i;
++ unsigned int len;
+
+ /* check tag length, return error if we can't provide the value expected */
+- if (tag_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
++ if (tag_len > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+ return err_status_bad_param;
+ }
+
+ /* hash message, copy output into H */
+- sha1_update(&state->ctx, message, msg_octets);
+- sha1_final(&state->ctx, H);
++ if (HMAC_Update(state, message, msg_octets) == 0)
++ return err_status_auth_fail;
+
+- /*
+- * note that we don't need to debug_print() the input, since the
+- * function hmac_update() already did that for us
+- */
+- debug_print(mod_hmac, "intermediate state: %s",
+- octet_string_hex_string((uint8_t*)H, sizeof(H)));
++ if (HMAC_Final(state, hash_value, &len) == 0)
++ return err_status_auth_fail;
+
+- /* re-initialize hash context */
+- sha1_init(&state->ctx);
++ if (len < tag_len)
++ return err_status_auth_fail;
+
+- /* hash opad ^ key */
+- sha1_update(&state->ctx, (uint8_t*)state->opad, sizeof(state->opad));
+-
+- /* hash the result of the inner hash */
+- sha1_update(&state->ctx, (uint8_t*)H, sizeof(H));
+-
+- /* the result is returned in the array hash_value[] */
+- sha1_final(&state->ctx, hash_value);
+-
+ /* copy hash_value to *result */
+ for (i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) {
+- result[i] = ((uint8_t*)hash_value)[i];
++ result[i] = hash_value[i];
+ }
+
+ debug_print(mod_hmac, "output: %s",
+- octet_string_hex_string((uint8_t*)hash_value, tag_len));
++ octet_string_hex_string(hash_value, tag_len));
+
+ return err_status_ok;
+ }
+@@ -248,7 +189,7 @@ hmac_compute (hmac_ctx_t *state, const void *message,
+ /* begin test case 0 */
+
+ uint8_t
+- hmac_test_case_0_key[HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX] = {
++ hmac_test_case_0_key[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {
+ 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+ 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+ 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b
+@@ -260,7 +201,7 @@ uint8_t
+ };
+
+ uint8_t
+- hmac_test_case_0_tag[HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX] = {
++ hmac_test_case_0_tag[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {
+ 0xb6, 0x17, 0x31, 0x86, 0x55, 0x05, 0x72, 0x64,
+ 0xe2, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0xb6, 0xfb, 0x37, 0x8c, 0x8e,
+ 0xf1, 0x46, 0xbe, 0x00
+--- a/crypto/include/hmac.h 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
++++ b/crypto/include/hmac.h
+@@ -53,10 +53,6 @@ typedef struct {
+ uint8_t opad[64];
+ sha1_ctx_t ctx;
+ sha1_ctx_t init_ctx;
+-#ifdef OPENSSL
+- int ctx_initialized;
+- int init_ctx_initialized;
+-#endif
+ } hmac_ctx_t;
+
+ err_status_t
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-07-01 13:17:42 +0000