diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files')
4 files changed, 494 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-CVE-2024-2511.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-CVE-2024-2511.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fff4fb72837b --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-CVE-2024-2511.patch @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20240408.txt +https://bugs.gentoo.org/930047 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/b52867a9f618bb955bed2a3ce3db4d4f97ed8e5d +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/cc9ece9118eeacccc3571c2ee852f8ba067d0607 + +From b52867a9f618bb955bed2a3ce3db4d4f97ed8e5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3 + +In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send. +We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in +use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if +early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being +used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session +simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads, +then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we +duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the +new session object. The new session object is then added to the session +cache even though it is not_resumable. + +Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for +sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is +still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from +the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the +cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely. + +CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044) + +(cherry picked from commit 7e4d731b1c07201ad9374c1cd9ac5263bdf35bce) +--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +@@ -3736,9 +3736,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) + + /* + * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it +- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) ++ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already ++ * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse. + */ +- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) ++ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable) + return; + + /* +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -152,16 +152,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) + return ss; + } + +-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) +-{ +- return ssl_session_dup(src, 1); +-} +- + /* + * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If + * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. + */ +-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + { + SSL_SESSION *dest; + +@@ -285,6 +280,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + return NULL; + } + ++SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) ++{ ++ return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared. ++ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked ++ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to ++ * resume from. ++ */ ++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++{ ++ SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket); ++ ++ if (sess != NULL) ++ sess->not_resumable = 0; ++ ++ return sess; ++} ++ + const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) + { + if (len) +--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c ++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +@@ -2338,9 +2338,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) + * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed + * to send back. + */ +- if (s->session->not_resumable || +- (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) +- && !s->hit)) ++ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) ++ && !s->hit) + s->session->session_id_length = 0; + + if (usetls13) { + +From cc9ece9118eeacccc3571c2ee852f8ba067d0607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 17:58:42 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Hardening around not_resumable sessions + +Make sure we can't inadvertently use a not_resumable session + +Related to CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044) + +(cherry picked from commit c342f4b8bd2d0b375b0e22337057c2eab47d9b96) +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -531,6 +531,12 @@ SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id, + ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, sess_id, sess_id_len, ©); + + if (ret != NULL) { ++ if (ret->not_resumable) { ++ /* If its not resumable then ignore this session */ ++ if (!copy) ++ SSL_SESSION_free(ret); ++ return NULL; ++ } + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, + &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); + diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-p11-segfault.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-p11-segfault.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..73b131ab7928 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.13-p11-segfault.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +https://bugs.gentoo.org/916328 +https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2/issues/729 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22508 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ad6cbe4b7f57a783a66a7ae883ea0d35ef5f82b6 + +From ad6cbe4b7f57a783a66a7ae883ea0d35ef5f82b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 13:45:50 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Improved detection of engine-provided private + "classic" keys" + +This reverts commit 2b74e75331a27fc89cad9c8ea6a26c70019300b5. + +The commit was wrong. With 3.x versions the engines must be themselves +responsible for creating their EVP_PKEYs in a way that they are treated +as legacy - either by using the respective set1 calls or by setting +non-default EVP_PKEY_METHOD. + +The workaround has caused more problems than it solved. + +Fixes #22945 + +Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23063) + +(cherry picked from commit 39ea78379826fa98e8dc8c0d2b07e2c17cd68380) +--- a/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c ++++ b/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c +@@ -79,48 +79,6 @@ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ENGINE, ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY); + return NULL; + } +- /* We enforce check for legacy key */ +- switch (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey)) { +- case EVP_PKEY_RSA: +- { +- RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); +- RSA_free(rsa); +- } +- break; +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +- case EVP_PKEY_SM2: +- case EVP_PKEY_EC: +- { +- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, ec); +- EC_KEY_free(ec); +- } +- break; +-# endif +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +- case EVP_PKEY_DSA: +- { +- DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, dsa); +- DSA_free(dsa); +- } +- break; +-#endif +-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +- case EVP_PKEY_DH: +- { +- DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(pkey); +- EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(pkey, dh); +- DH_free(dh); +- } +- break; +-#endif +- default: +- /*Do nothing */ +- break; +- } +- + return pkey; + } + + diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-CVE-2024-2511.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-CVE-2024-2511.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c5b7dfe449f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.5-CVE-2024-2511.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20240408.txt +https://bugs.gentoo.org/930047 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7e4d731b1c07201ad9374c1cd9ac5263bdf35bce +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c342f4b8bd2d0b375b0e22337057c2eab47d9b96 + +From 7e4d731b1c07201ad9374c1cd9ac5263bdf35bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3 + +In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send. +We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in +use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if +early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being +used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session +simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads, +then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we +duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the +new session object. The new session object is then added to the session +cache even though it is not_resumable. + +Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for +sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is +still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from +the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the +cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely. + +CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044) +--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +@@ -3737,9 +3737,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) + + /* + * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it +- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) ++ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already ++ * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse. + */ +- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) ++ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable) + return; + + /* +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -154,16 +154,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) + return ss; + } + +-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) +-{ +- return ssl_session_dup(src, 1); +-} +- + /* + * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If + * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. + */ +-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + { + SSL_SESSION *dest; + +@@ -287,6 +282,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + return NULL; + } + ++SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) ++{ ++ return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared. ++ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked ++ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to ++ * resume from. ++ */ ++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++{ ++ SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket); ++ ++ if (sess != NULL) ++ sess->not_resumable = 0; ++ ++ return sess; ++} ++ + const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) + { + if (len) +--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c ++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +@@ -2338,9 +2338,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) + * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed + * to send back. + */ +- if (s->session->not_resumable || +- (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) +- && !s->hit)) ++ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) ++ && !s->hit) + s->session->session_id_length = 0; + + if (usetls13) { + +From c342f4b8bd2d0b375b0e22337057c2eab47d9b96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 17:58:42 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Hardening around not_resumable sessions + +Make sure we can't inadvertently use a not_resumable session + +Related to CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044) +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -533,6 +533,12 @@ SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id, + ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, sess_id, sess_id_len, ©); + + if (ret != NULL) { ++ if (ret->not_resumable) { ++ /* If its not resumable then ignore this session */ ++ if (!copy) ++ SSL_SESSION_free(ret); ++ return NULL; ++ } + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, + &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); + diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d5b40447d745 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20240408.txt +https://bugs.gentoo.org/930047 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e9d7083e241670332e0443da0f0d4ffb52829f08 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d67109432646c113887b0aa8091fb0d1b3057e6 + +From e9d7083e241670332e0443da0f0d4ffb52829f08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3 + +In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send. +We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in +use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if +early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being +used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session +simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads, +then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we +duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the +new session object. The new session object is then added to the session +cache even though it is not_resumable. + +Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for +sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is +still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from +the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the +cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely. + +CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24043) +--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +@@ -4457,9 +4457,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mode) + + /* + * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it +- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) ++ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already ++ * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse. + */ +- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) ++ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable) + return; + + /* +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -127,16 +127,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) + return ss; + } + +-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) +-{ +- return ssl_session_dup(src, 1); +-} +- + /* + * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If + * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. + */ +-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + { + SSL_SESSION *dest; + +@@ -265,6 +260,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + return NULL; + } + ++SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) ++{ ++ return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared. ++ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked ++ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to ++ * resume from. ++ */ ++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++{ ++ SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket); ++ ++ if (sess != NULL) ++ sess->not_resumable = 0; ++ ++ return sess; ++} ++ + const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) + { + if (len) +--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c ++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +@@ -2445,9 +2445,8 @@ CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) + * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed + * to send back. + */ +- if (s->session->not_resumable || +- (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) +- && !s->hit)) ++ if (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) ++ && !s->hit) + s->session->session_id_length = 0; + + if (usetls13) { + +From 4d67109432646c113887b0aa8091fb0d1b3057e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 17:58:42 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Hardening around not_resumable sessions + +Make sure we can't inadvertently use a not_resumable session + +Related to CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24043) +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -519,6 +519,12 @@ SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + sess_id, sess_id_len, ©); + + if (ret != NULL) { ++ if (ret->not_resumable) { ++ /* If its not resumable then ignore this session */ ++ if (!copy) ++ SSL_SESSION_free(ret); ++ return NULL; ++ } + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, + &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); + |