summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch')
-rw-r--r--dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch137
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d5b40447d745
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-CVE-2024-2511.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20240408.txt
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/930047
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e9d7083e241670332e0443da0f0d4ffb52829f08
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d67109432646c113887b0aa8091fb0d1b3057e6
+
+From e9d7083e241670332e0443da0f0d4ffb52829f08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3
+
+In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send.
+We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in
+use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if
+early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being
+used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session
+simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads,
+then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we
+duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the
+new session object. The new session object is then added to the session
+cache even though it is not_resumable.
+
+Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for
+sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is
+still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from
+the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the
+cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely.
+
+CVE-2024-2511
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24043)
+--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -4457,9 +4457,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mode)
+
+ /*
+ * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
+- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
++ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already
++ * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse.
+ */
+- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
++ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+@@ -127,16 +127,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
+ return ss;
+ }
+
+-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src)
+-{
+- return ssl_session_dup(src, 1);
+-}
+-
+ /*
+ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
+ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
+ */
+-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
++static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION *dest;
+
+@@ -265,6 +260,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
++SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src)
++{
++ return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared.
++ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked
++ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to
++ * resume from.
++ */
++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
++{
++ SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket);
++
++ if (sess != NULL)
++ sess->not_resumable = 0;
++
++ return sess;
++}
++
+ const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
+ {
+ if (len)
+--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+@@ -2445,9 +2445,8 @@ CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+ * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+ * to send back.
+ */
+- if (s->session->not_resumable ||
+- (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+- && !s->hit))
++ if (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
++ && !s->hit)
+ s->session->session_id_length = 0;
+
+ if (usetls13) {
+
+From 4d67109432646c113887b0aa8091fb0d1b3057e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 17:58:42 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Hardening around not_resumable sessions
+
+Make sure we can't inadvertently use a not_resumable session
+
+Related to CVE-2024-2511
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24043)
+--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+@@ -519,6 +519,12 @@ SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ sess_id, sess_id_len, &copy);
+
+ if (ret != NULL) {
++ if (ret->not_resumable) {
++ /* If its not resumable then ignore this session */
++ if (!copy)
++ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
+ &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
+