diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-3446.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-3446.patch | 121 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 121 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-3446.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-3446.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 781b0c8f48b3..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.1-CVE-2023-3446.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,121 +0,0 @@ -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/fc9867c1e03c22ebf56943be205202e576aabf23 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4791e79b8803924b28c19af4d4036ad85335110d - -From fc9867c1e03c22ebf56943be205202e576aabf23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> -Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus - -The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters -that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus -value even if it is excessively large. - -There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which -OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still -perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a -new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail. - -An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters -obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of -Service attack. - -The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL -functions. An application calling any of those other functions may -similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are -DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check(). - -CVE-2023-3446 - -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> -Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451) - -(cherry picked from commit 9e0094e2aa1b3428a12d5095132f133c078d3c3d) ---- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c -+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c -@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret) - if (nid != NID_undef) - return 1; - -+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */ -+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret)) - return 0; - ---- a/include/openssl/dh.h -+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h -@@ -92,7 +92,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm); - # include <openssl/dherr.h> - - # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS --# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 -+# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 -+# endif -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS -+# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768 - # endif - - # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024 - -From 4791e79b8803924b28c19af4d4036ad85335110d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> -Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2023 14:39:48 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Add a test for CVE-2023-3446 - -Confirm that the only errors DH_check() finds with DH parameters with an -excessively long modulus is that the modulus is too large. We should not -be performing time consuming checks using that modulus. - -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> -Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451) - -(cherry picked from commit ede782b4c8868d1f09c9cd237f82b6f35b7dba8b) ---- a/test/dhtest.c -+++ b/test/dhtest.c -@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dh_test(void) - goto err1; - - /* check fails, because p is way too small */ -- if (!DH_check(dh, &i)) -+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i))) - goto err2; - i ^= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL; - if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) -@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ static int dh_test(void) - /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */ - ERR_clear_error(); - -+ /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS))) -+ goto err3; -+ -+ /* -+ * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus -+ */ -+ if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i))) -+ goto err3; -+ - /* - * II) key generation - */ -@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ static int dh_test(void) - goto err3; - - /* ... and check whether it is valid */ -- if (!DH_check(a, &i)) -+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i))) - goto err3; - if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) - || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME) - |