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author | V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> | 2017-10-09 18:53:29 +0100 |
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committer | V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> | 2017-10-09 18:53:29 +0100 |
commit | 4f2d7949f03e1c198bc888f2d05f421d35c57e21 (patch) | |
tree | ba5f07bf3f9d22d82e54a462313f5d244036c768 /net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch |
reinit the tree, so we can have metadata
Diffstat (limited to 'net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch | 50 |
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5f42aa9219c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2016-1/0005-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the + string values + +Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings +without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the +value, unexpected configuration file data might be written. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data +into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in +wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, +pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user +controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that +library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index 69152ef..d9a1603 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data, + return -1; + } + ++ if (has_newline(pos)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline", ++ line, data->name); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + tmp = os_strdup(pos); + if (tmp == NULL) + return -1; +-- +1.9.1 + |