diff options
author | V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> | 2017-12-25 17:37:52 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> | 2017-12-25 17:37:52 +0000 |
commit | 2f51c9978dda4c6e8debca43e4235ecc86914032 (patch) | |
tree | bc41e1c4383040034174c327504f702c8517a123 /net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7 | |
parent | 51536d2fe4697ba9114d611178bb9e20d3d5b729 (diff) |
gentoo resync : 25.12.2017
Diffstat (limited to 'net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7')
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 105 deletions
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 82c26398b69d..000000000000 --- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation - -All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining -room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last -fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. -The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual -buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process -termination. (CVE-2015-5315) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++---- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - /* - * buffer and ACK the fragment - */ -- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { - data->in_frag_pos += len; - if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack " -@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - return NULL; - } - wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); -- -+ } -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { - resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, - EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE, - EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData)); -@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - * we're buffering and this is the last fragment - */ - if (data->in_frag_pos) { -- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", - (int) len); -- data->in_frag_pos += len; - pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); - len = data->in_frag_pos; - } --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index bfc4c74e95ca..000000000000 --- a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation - -All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining -room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last -fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. -The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual -buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process -termination. (CVE-2015-5314) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++--- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644 ---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - /* - * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set - */ -- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { - if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow " - "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)", -@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - } - wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); - data->in_frag_pos += len; -+ } -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment", - (int) len); - return; -@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last) - */ - if (data->in_frag_pos) { -- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); -- data->in_frag_pos += len; - pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); - len = data->in_frag_pos; - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", --- -1.9.1 - |