gentoo resync : 24.12.2018

4 files changed, 0 insertions, 350 deletions

diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.0i-CVE-2018-0734.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.0i-CVE-2018-0734.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 47b082f4085f..000000000000
--- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.0i-CVE-2018-0734.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-CVE-2018-0734
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/415c33563528667868c3c653a612e6fc8736fd79
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ef11e19d1365eea2b1851e6f540a0bf365d303e7
-
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
- 
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/sha.h>
- #include "dsa_locl.h"
-@@ -25,6 +26,8 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-                          DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
- static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
- static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa);
-+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
-+                                      BN_CTX *ctx);
- 
- static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
-     "OpenSSL DSA method",
-@@ -180,9 +183,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- {
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp;
--    BIGNUM *l, *m;
-+    BIGNUM *l;
-     int ret = 0;
--    int q_bits;
-+    int q_bits, q_words;
- 
-     if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
-         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-@@ -191,8 +194,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- 
-     k = BN_new();
-     l = BN_new();
--    m = BN_new();
--    if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL)
-+    if (k == NULL || l == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
-     if (ctx_in == NULL) {
-@@ -203,9 +205,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- 
-     /* Preallocate space */
-     q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
--    if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits)
--        || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits)
--        || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits))
-+    q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q);
-+    if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2)
-+        || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2))
-         goto err;
- 
-     /* Get random k */
-@@ -240,14 +242,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
-      * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
-      * one bit longer than the modulus.
-      *
--     * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
--     * conditional copy.
-+     * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this.  More
-+     * specificly refer to the discussion starting with:
-+     *     https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705
-+     * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required.
-      */
-     if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q)
--        || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q)
--        || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m))
-+        || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q))
-         goto err;
- 
-+    BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2);
-+
-     if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
-             if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx,
-                                        dsa->method_mont_p))
-@@ -260,8 +265,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
-     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
-         goto err;
- 
--    /* Compute  part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
--    if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
-+    /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
-+    if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
-     BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
-@@ -275,7 +280,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
-         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-     BN_clear_free(k);
-     BN_clear_free(l);
--    BN_clear_free(m);
-     return ret;
- }
- 
-@@ -395,3 +399,31 @@ static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
-     BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
-     return (1);
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Compute the inverse of k modulo q.
-+ * Since q is prime, Fermat's Little Theorem applies, which reduces this to
-+ * mod-exp operation.  Both the exponent and modulus are public information
-+ * so a mod-exp that doesn't leak the base is sufficient.  A newly allocated
-+ * BIGNUM is returned which the caller must free.
-+ */
-+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
-+                                      BN_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+    BIGNUM *res = NULL;
-+    BIGNUM *r, *e;
-+
-+    if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+        return NULL;
-+
-+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+    if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) != NULL
-+            && BN_set_word(r, 2)
-+            && BN_sub(e, q, r)
-+            && BN_mod_exp_mont(r, k, e, q, ctx, NULL))
-+        res = r;
-+    else
-+        BN_free(r);
-+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-+    return res;
-+}
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.0i-CVE-2018-0735.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.0i-CVE-2018-0735.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5762c04fa340..000000000000
--- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.0i-CVE-2018-0735.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 56fb454d281a023b3f950d969693553d3f3ceea1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 10:54:58 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation
- (CVE-2018-0735)
-
-Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation
-that can potentially provide a side channel.
-
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 99540ec79491f59ed8b46b4edf130e17dc907f52)
----
- crypto/ec/ec_mult.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
-index 22bb30ffa1..ff882cce20 100644
---- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
-+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
-@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
-      */
-     cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
-     group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality);
--    if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL)
--        || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL))
-+    if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL)
-+        || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL))
-         goto err;
- 
-     if (!BN_copy(k, scalar))
-@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
-      * k := scalar + 2*cardinality
-      */
-     kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
--    BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1);
-+    BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2);
- 
-     group_top = bn_get_top(group->field);
-     if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL)
--- 
-2.19.1
-
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dbc379c80d43..000000000000
--- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-CVE-2018-0734
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f1b12b8713a739f27d74e6911580b2e70aea2fa4
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8abfe72e8c1de1b95f50aa0d9134803b4d00070f
-
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
- 
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/sha.h>
- #include "dsa_locl.h"
-@@ -23,6 +24,8 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-                          DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
- static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
- static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa);
-+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
-+                                      BN_CTX *ctx);
- 
- static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
-     "OpenSSL DSA method",
-@@ -178,9 +181,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- {
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp;
--    BIGNUM *l, *m;
-+    BIGNUM *l;
-     int ret = 0;
--    int q_bits;
-+    int q_bits, q_words;
- 
-     if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
-         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-@@ -189,8 +192,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- 
-     k = BN_new();
-     l = BN_new();
--    m = BN_new();
--    if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL)
-+    if (k == NULL || l == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
-     if (ctx_in == NULL) {
-@@ -201,9 +203,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- 
-     /* Preallocate space */
-     q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
--    if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits)
--        || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits)
--        || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits))
-+    q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q);
-+    if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2)
-+        || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2))
-         goto err;
- 
-     /* Get random k */
-@@ -238,14 +240,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
-      * small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum that is
-      * one bit longer than the modulus.
-      *
--     * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
--     * conditional copy.
-+     * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this.  More
-+     * specificly refer to the discussion starting with:
-+     *     https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705
-+     * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required.
-      */
-     if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q)
--        || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q)
--        || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m))
-+        || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q))
-         goto err;
- 
-+    BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2);
-+
-     if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
-             if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx,
-                                        dsa->method_mont_p))
-@@ -258,8 +263,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
-     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
-         goto err;
- 
--    /* Compute  part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
--    if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
-+    /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
-+    if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
-     BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
-@@ -273,7 +278,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
-         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-     BN_clear_free(k);
-     BN_clear_free(l);
--    BN_clear_free(m);
-     return ret;
- }
- 
-@@ -393,3 +397,31 @@ static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
-     BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
-     return 1;
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Compute the inverse of k modulo q.
-+ * Since q is prime, Fermat's Little Theorem applies, which reduces this to
-+ * mod-exp operation.  Both the exponent and modulus are public information
-+ * so a mod-exp that doesn't leak the base is sufficient.  A newly allocated
-+ * BIGNUM is returned which the caller must free.
-+ */
-+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q,
-+                                      BN_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+    BIGNUM *res = NULL;
-+    BIGNUM *r, *e;
-+
-+    if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+        return NULL;
-+
-+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+    if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) != NULL
-+            && BN_set_word(r, 2)
-+            && BN_sub(e, q, r)
-+            && BN_mod_exp_mont(r, k, e, q, ctx, NULL))
-+        res = r;
-+    else
-+        BN_free(r);
-+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-+    return res;
-+}
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0735.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0735.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 295f5dbe8d82..000000000000
--- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0735.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From b1d6d55ece1c26fa2829e2b819b038d7b6d692b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 10:54:58 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation
- (CVE-2018-0735)
-
-Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation
-that can potentially provide a side channel.
-
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 99540ec79491f59ed8b46b4edf130e17dc907f52)
----
- crypto/ec/ec_mult.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
-index 7e1b3650e7..0e0a5e1394 100644
---- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
-+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
-@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
-      */
-     cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
-     group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality);
--    if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL)
--        || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL)) {
-+    if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL)
-+        || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) {
-         ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-         goto err;
-     }
-@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
-      * k := scalar + 2*cardinality
-      */
-     kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
--    BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1);
-+    BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2);
- 
-     group_top = bn_get_top(group->field);
-     if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL)
--- 
-2.19.1
-