gentoo resync : 16.02.1018

5 files changed, 352 insertions, 68 deletions

diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/Manifest b/app-emulation/runc/Manifest
index ae566c7280b3..1d3e43b86db6 100644
--- a/app-emulation/runc/Manifest
+++ b/app-emulation/runc/Manifest
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
+AUX runc-fix-cve.patch 8949 BLAKE2B b968b811c139a15d39daf78bbffac35aad583f1ca1cfe4c24ecf150588269d757329cc64643084a869593faae8c1a8e56b998985be7b94c7a4a98679292aab03 SHA512 51c87fc5d3584c86d6a9f92ffd2c9f66c2d9b9f0373370e910069e778f9acd10bfb4ae450b0ec1722f80d601810057402884992d9f8b7608f13e3bf9c007a28a
 DIST runc-1.0.0_rc5.tar.gz 1183902 BLAKE2B 46d0ffd9aa79a6f74b3194fa9e1932390115a43c903ae553acb7749d6be41220874a1ff9bae9706b5fecb9495dd6686c38ee1e9baf6118a14990f142baf6f64d SHA512 714230887ff9706c29b0656c5cdb253698bde6252a23e7f48aa690747fb57abd7884c2da1c4d0e314f9f301c5962417351557d15d986e45fcc336e98069aeac6
 DIST runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509.tar.gz 1185576 BLAKE2B b56f9c185c061f51a1fd81c19d378b06c71d06c6eddcbc1c946b234814eb469ea4af37bf42ef3889e4d37bc430e69d0a563281b13055f855f1bc15935531fe28 SHA512 9a55bdb8e39830f46cceff48970b7688139927552e3d268b9ef4a6e640ffc3d95164b99c5b05d07d295bedc2ea22daf6062fd520df1548d78b1d481fd928f1e3
-DIST runc-1.0.0_rc6.tar.gz 1202212 BLAKE2B 2795b6e88a9587fac61a50bfea52a9df8524eb87aae66129d7ea83e8c3ca586efc60a46d24af857f7ba50f8e4d7021cbd2845d322a8c0ad08be3e0f19d80ba3b SHA512 2f7ed5e835f000d9810a116a27300336f424ac2c370dd1c7d158e26a4997d1e8398612387be27cc22cc25fdd52cc4cff7963ef88ce9c41d337321b75d9be2334
 DIST runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203.tar.gz 1202869 BLAKE2B 5b5808fc65f3725e5cc22794c5ff6c5eba6016110358b0f60dd3378df2e5b64afb5631e5652f45e9721838dd02745b8c5a88abfcd244de202196ac16bfccd5a7 SHA512 ec3d3fec773f2f9df714b0813efb110e21e328634e0b4ae77f323a892d0327aea5d4b6f9ae2a549aa06fda5b27431f4514fd663c7033dc170ca1a03627931f9d
 EBUILD runc-1.0.0_rc5-r1.ebuild 1296 BLAKE2B 837b2acae2f5b76fea1e49c4a49b8149e9f6fe5ac06555f1ec23720ab947d5586f00d333165a2fc200a22caa7a3616976f856bf45db6769db4b991c7d27ec0f5 SHA512 746a2751e39deebac58542a5a4687fd53523046e2b12f5f543a7ef7d891adc145bd4deaaf2e42535651eb608d2b58e5ee2f9c7db64c8c32bd5805934cc8c4c39
-EBUILD runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509.ebuild 1293 BLAKE2B fb959be90dcd20df0504a031ee478235cc3b7da2b2638441af00fd25036472ac9724682d54e6b1e7c66adf92dd40ea341c586cebc00a81860cf5be19b001c3f4 SHA512 f779767205e310998bd58f456c6a31670b6ac36fa859fda489c11f9053995890dca5473a27dbf229ad9c21776cde75a749cb9d787d8476e7207a33b2e601fcf8
-EBUILD runc-1.0.0_rc6.ebuild 1468 BLAKE2B 555c76381e17abcdb4c24d95602817a54bd5cdacb867de12b100842da272e1c076d85db961b2394c9781d05528d59863544a69a000598c928bc0871b0b94096e SHA512 867a0495da8d9c5ec78d9480b9ee053d26d5edd15eb57cf2777812040aa86fd41b3c471e2cd6acf61c1f5fd1c97ae2227995549121773a3b0d7c2ee319a0a410
-EBUILD runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203.ebuild 1468 BLAKE2B 28e60cfb54e02204e13eb28af02e7bce670bd6213c7d9a45b90980639391fbbe2b1b96de74ff806d4a19e464641e02317b1cec0330b3775b4251dd56cd2ea6d5 SHA512 2c58e0a87a84de3a524b0abf863f3398f1193fcbbf1da7ea2f6d85f26776055cb39deebbb9b21a7a54ca358b12d5d50f98d4f5cad8b75729079045c1fef33b04
+EBUILD runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509-r1.ebuild 1408 BLAKE2B c5dde23793e7966a4d89a58d14b086e2d4a93825ac4385638b58739b583cceacd557cffb053f87de4029c55adf8ae982b1a761f7f1688fe3b49a16e94446bf34 SHA512 0cbe830942bee1b4e8dd229c29ace4a5f41244a6b1c1be1ca9e12d69bbecfb9179d7119f52fb0ec9cfbf74940f58bee57a5ae4ee0cf795fa969f5c925694a869
+EBUILD runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild 1534 BLAKE2B d907412e7df715865af6a5208f78b83134e2130fc00a29397b5881a74622cc9f4a0a396f7b132245840e2dccb0ffc41ceaa597070a2a8f6b66168fc4e41c2c3b SHA512 bb21bdbb24cf9ccc62c99a378efd6fe15f71587abdc487ee556e155fa33d041e3ea8e3cabca7a8c3af6154884bbc2508d9cf978c1c786bb87661bb266d93cd82
 EBUILD runc-9999.ebuild 1080 BLAKE2B 09034744e5842eb2a340b3095ee3098c58b0853d81ee899b2b8e84c15ffe59638bfc6fb89d158edd4271f1e630c97dafdb4cbe7fb9286049dfe2bbf5eef213ed SHA512 b026b5cbfd44e110a2c2cd72125c757c6b957137fe9491b85e1f25014b564226a3e76c23ea463fd4d7ad742228b2b7bc533aa6b2539b43ca5c37aa2dd07218e3
 MISC metadata.xml 870 BLAKE2B e7fdbbe8bd178b4781f9a1345cb3473b9b2371db7f824ec3351a117d8c07c4dfa208eb1d1ef946576a6aa972bb055eba03c934f2388538998bee0e742e31151f SHA512 090b4cdf0cf933ad782e9b68df78aec48265222083a17c5f8e387943b9b535fe3d3ba751629f5c3978987572a2f1e821514e54a7f5327164f0ee8f5ce48efcdd
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch b/app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fa85cb0444f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/runc/files/runc-fix-cve.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+From 0a8e4117e7f715d5fbeef398405813ce8e88558b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 13:40:01 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] nsenter: clone /proc/self/exe to avoid exposing host binary
+ to container
+
+There are quite a few circumstances where /proc/self/exe pointing to a
+pretty important container binary is a _bad_ thing, so to avoid this we
+have to make a copy (preferably doing self-clean-up and not being
+writeable).
+
+We require memfd_create(2) -- though there is an O_TMPFILE fallback --
+but we can always extend this to use a scratch MNT_DETACH overlayfs or
+tmpfs. The main downside to this approach is no page-cache sharing for
+the runc binary (which overlayfs would give us) but this is far less
+complicated.
+
+This is only done during nsenter so that it happens transparently to the
+Go code, and any libcontainer users benefit from it. This also makes
+ExtraFiles and --preserve-fds handling trivial (because we don't need to
+worry about it).
+
+Fixes: CVE-2019-5736
+Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+---
+ libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c        |  11 ++
+ 2 files changed, 279 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+
+diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..c8a42c23f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2019 Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
++ * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE LLC
++ *
++ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
++ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
++ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
++ *
++ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
++ *
++ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
++ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
++ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
++ * limitations under the License.
++ */
++
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <limits.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/vfs.h>
++#include <sys/mman.h>
++#include <sys/sendfile.h>
++#include <sys/syscall.h>
++
++/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */
++#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
++#  define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
++#endif
++#ifdef SYS_memfd_create
++#  define HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
++/* memfd_create(2) flags -- copied from <linux/memfd.h>. */
++#  ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC
++#    define MFD_CLOEXEC       0x0001U
++#    define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U
++#  endif
++int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
++{
++	return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
++}
++#endif
++
++/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
++#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
++#  define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
++#endif
++#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS
++#  define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
++#  define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
++#endif
++#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL
++#  define F_SEAL_SEAL   0x0001	/* prevent further seals from being set */
++#  define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002	/* prevent file from shrinking */
++#  define F_SEAL_GROW   0x0004	/* prevent file from growing */
++#  define F_SEAL_WRITE  0x0008	/* prevent writes */
++#endif
++
++#define RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */
++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
++#  define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
++#  define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \
++	(F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE)
++#endif
++
++static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
++{
++	void *old = ptr;
++	do {
++		ptr = realloc(old, size);
++	} while(!ptr);
++	return ptr;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is
++ * /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or rather
++ * for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed.
++ */
++static int is_self_cloned(void)
++{
++	int fd, ret, is_cloned = 0;
++
++	fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (fd < 0)
++		return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
++
++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
++	ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
++	is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
++#else
++	struct stat statbuf = {0};
++	ret = fstat(fd, &statbuf);
++	if (ret >= 0)
++		is_cloned = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
++#endif
++	close(fd);
++	return is_cloned;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can
++ * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access.
++ */
++static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
++{
++	int fd;
++	char buf[4096], *copy = NULL;
++
++	if (!length)
++		return NULL;
++
++	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (fd < 0)
++		return NULL;
++
++	*length = 0;
++	for (;;) {
++		int n;
++
++		n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
++		if (n < 0)
++			goto error;
++		if (!n)
++			break;
++
++		copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy));
++		memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n);
++		*length += n;
++	}
++	close(fd);
++	return copy;
++
++error:
++	close(fd);
++	free(copy);
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/*
++ * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of
++ * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry
++ * to the array of pointers.
++ */
++static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output)
++{
++	int num = 0;
++	char *cur = data;
++
++	if (!data || *output != NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	while (cur < data + data_length) {
++		num++;
++		*output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output));
++		(*output)[num - 1] = cur;
++		cur += strlen(cur) + 1;
++	}
++	(*output)[num] = NULL;
++	return num;
++}
++
++/*
++ * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ.
++ * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
++ * main() that we can just get the arguments from.
++ */
++static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp)
++{
++	char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL;
++	size_t cmdline_size, environ_size;
++
++	cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
++	if (!cmdline)
++		goto error;
++	environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size);
++	if (!environ)
++		goto error;
++
++	if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
++		goto error;
++	if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	return 0;
++
++error:
++	free(environ);
++	free(cmdline);
++	return -EINVAL;
++}
++
++static int clone_binary(void)
++{
++	int binfd, memfd;
++	ssize_t sent = 0;
++
++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
++	memfd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
++#else
++	memfd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0711);
++#endif
++	if (memfd < 0)
++		return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
++
++	binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (binfd < 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX);
++	close(binfd);
++	if (sent < 0)
++		goto error;
++
++#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
++	int err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
++	if (err < 0)
++		goto error;
++#else
++	/* Need to re-open "memfd" as read-only to avoid execve(2) giving -EXTBUSY. */
++	int newfd;
++	char *fdpath = NULL;
++
++	if (asprintf(&fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", memfd) < 0)
++		goto error;
++	newfd = open(fdpath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
++	free(fdpath);
++	if (newfd < 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	close(memfd);
++	memfd = newfd;
++#endif
++	return memfd;
++
++error:
++	close(memfd);
++	return -EIO;
++}
++
++int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
++{
++	int execfd;
++	char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL;
++
++	/* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
++	int cloned = is_self_cloned();
++	if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE)
++		return cloned;
++
++	if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	execfd = clone_binary();
++	if (execfd < 0)
++		return -EIO;
++
++	fexecve(execfd, argv, envp);
++	return -ENOEXEC;
++}
+diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
+index 28269dfc0..7750af35e 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
++++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
+@@ -534,6 +534,9 @@ void join_namespaces(char *nslist)
+ 	free(namespaces);
+ }
+ 
++/* Defined in cloned_binary.c. */
++extern int ensure_cloned_binary(void);
++
+ void nsexec(void)
+ {
+ 	int pipenum;
+@@ -549,6 +552,14 @@ void nsexec(void)
+ 	if (pipenum == -1)
+ 		return;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * We need to re-exec if we are not in a cloned binary. This is necessary
++	 * to ensure that containers won't be able to access the host binary
++	 * through /proc/self/exe. See CVE-2019-5736.
++	 */
++	if (ensure_cloned_binary() < 0)
++		bail("could not ensure we are a cloned binary");
++
+ 	/* Parse all of the netlink configuration. */
+ 	nl_parse(pipenum, &config);
+ 
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509.ebuild b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509-r1.ebuild
index eb9cce7cf94b..992fdf609d60 100644
--- a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509.ebuild
+++ b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc5_p20180509-r1.ebuild
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Authors
+# Copyright 1999-2019 Gentoo Authors
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
 
 EAPI=6
@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@ RDEPEND="
 	!app-emulation/docker-runc
 "
 
+PATCHES=( "${FILESDIR}"/runc-fix-cve.patch )
+
+src_prepare() {
+	pushd src/${EGO_PN} || die
+	default
+	popd || die
+}
+
 src_compile() {
 	# Taken from app-emulation/docker-1.7.0-r1
 	export CGO_CFLAGS="-I${ROOT}/usr/include"
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6.ebuild b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index cb15bc43aaf8..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Authors
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-
-EAPI=6
-EGO_PN="github.com/opencontainers/${PN}"
-
-if [[ ${PV} == *9999 ]]; then
-	inherit golang-build golang-vcs
-else
-	MY_PV="${PV/_/-}"
-	RUNC_COMMIT="ccb5efd37fb7c86364786e9137e22948751de7ed" # Change this when you update the ebuild
-	SRC_URI="https://${EGO_PN}/archive/${RUNC_COMMIT}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz"
-	KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~ppc64"
-	inherit golang-build golang-vcs-snapshot
-fi
-
-DESCRIPTION="runc container cli tools"
-HOMEPAGE="http://runc.io"
-
-LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="+ambient apparmor hardened +kmem +seccomp"
-
-RDEPEND="
-	apparmor? ( sys-libs/libapparmor )
-	seccomp? ( sys-libs/libseccomp )
-	!app-emulation/docker-runc
-"
-
-src_prepare() {
-	default
-	sed -i -e "/^GIT_BRANCH/d"\
-		-e "/^GIT_BRANCH_CLEAN/d"\
-		-e "/^COMMIT_NO/d"\
-		-e "s/COMMIT :=.*/COMMIT := ${RUNC_COMMIT}/"\
-		src/${EGO_PN}/Makefile || die
-}
-
-src_compile() {
-	# Taken from app-emulation/docker-1.7.0-r1
-	export CGO_CFLAGS="-I${ROOT}/usr/include"
-	export CGO_LDFLAGS="$(usex hardened '-fno-PIC ' '')
-		-L${ROOT}/usr/$(get_libdir)"
-
-	# build up optional flags
-	local options=(
-		$(usex ambient 'ambient' '')
-		$(usex apparmor 'apparmor' '')
-		$(usex seccomp 'seccomp' '')
-		$(usex kmem '' 'nokmem')
-	)
-
-	GOPATH="${S}" emake BUILDTAGS="${options[*]}" -C src/${EGO_PN}
-}
-
-src_install() {
-	pushd src/${EGO_PN} || die
-	dobin runc
-	dodoc README.md PRINCIPLES.md
-	popd || die
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203.ebuild b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild
index c422609ace86..893c249793a5 100644
--- a/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203.ebuild
+++ b/app-emulation/runc/runc-1.0.0_rc6_p20181203-r1.ebuild
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ else
 	MY_PV="${PV/_/-}"
 	RUNC_COMMIT="96ec2177ae841256168fcf76954f7177af9446eb" # Change this when you update the ebuild
 	SRC_URI="https://${EGO_PN}/archive/${RUNC_COMMIT}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz"
-	KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~ppc64"
+	KEYWORDS="amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~ppc64"
 	inherit golang-build golang-vcs-snapshot
 fi
 
@@ -27,13 +27,17 @@ RDEPEND="
 	!app-emulation/docker-runc
 "
 
+PATCHES=( "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-fix-cve.patch" )
+
 src_prepare() {
+	pushd src/${EGO_PN}
 	default
 	sed -i -e "/^GIT_BRANCH/d"\
 		-e "/^GIT_BRANCH_CLEAN/d"\
 		-e "/^COMMIT_NO/d"\
 		-e "s/COMMIT :=.*/COMMIT := ${RUNC_COMMIT}/"\
-		src/${EGO_PN}/Makefile || die
+		Makefile || die
+	popd || die
 }
 
 src_compile() {