From 948d557b4a61dc14722668b6b11a4cf3cee07b01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: V3n3RiX Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2019 17:56:30 +0100 Subject: gentoo resync : 13.09.2019 --- .../files/cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-CVE-2013-4122.patch | 116 --------------------- 1 file changed, 116 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 dev-libs/cyrus-sasl/files/cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-CVE-2013-4122.patch (limited to 'dev-libs/cyrus-sasl/files/cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-CVE-2013-4122.patch') diff --git a/dev-libs/cyrus-sasl/files/cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-CVE-2013-4122.patch b/dev-libs/cyrus-sasl/files/cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-CVE-2013-4122.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 09c9ce86c9ac..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/cyrus-sasl/files/cyrus-sasl-2.1.26-CVE-2013-4122.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,116 +0,0 @@ -From dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: mancha -Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 09:08:07 +0000 -Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt() - -Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL -(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally, -on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords -passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return). - -When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible -NULL pointer dereference. - -Patch by mancha1@hush.com. ---- -diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c -index 4b34222..400289c 100644 ---- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c -+++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c -@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ char *userid; - char *password; - { - char* r; -+ char* crpt_passwd; - struct passwd *pwd; - - pwd = getpwnam(userid); -@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password; - else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') { - r = "Account disabled"; - } -- else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) { -+ else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) { - r = "Incorrect password"; - } - else { -diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c -index 2b11286..6d607bb 100644 ---- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c -+++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c -@@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ char *userid; - char *password; - { - struct spwd *pwd; -+ char *crpt_passwd; - - pwd = getspnam(userid); - if (!pwd) { - return "Userid not found"; - } - -- if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) { -+ crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp); -+ if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) { - return "Incorrect password"; - } - else { -diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c -index fc8029d..d4ebe54 100644 ---- a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c -+++ b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c -@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ auth_getpwent ( - { - /* VARIABLES */ - struct passwd *pw; /* pointer to passwd file entry */ -+ char *crpt_passwd; /* encrypted password */ - int errnum; - /* END VARIABLES */ - -@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ auth_getpwent ( - } - } - -- if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) { -+ crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd); -+ if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) { - if (flags & VERBOSE) { - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_getpwent: %s: invalid password", login); - } -diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c -index 677131b..1988afd 100644 ---- a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c -+++ b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c -@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ auth_shadow ( - RETURN("NO Insufficient permission to access NIS authentication database (saslauthd)"); - } - -- cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp)); -- if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) { -+ cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp); -+ if (!cpw || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) { - if (flags & VERBOSE) { - /* - * This _should_ reveal the SHADOW_PW_LOCKED prefix to an -@@ -221,10 +221,8 @@ auth_shadow ( - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'", - sp->sp_pwdp, cpw); - } -- free(cpw); - RETURN("NO Incorrect password"); - } -- free(cpw); - - /* - * The following fields will be set to -1 if: -@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ auth_shadow ( - RETURN("NO Invalid username"); - } - -- if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) { -+ if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) { - if (flags & VERBOSE) { - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s", - password, upw->upw_passwd); --- -cgit v0.9.0.2 -- cgit v1.2.3