diff options
author | V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> | 2019-03-19 11:37:34 +0000 |
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committer | V3n3RiX <venerix@redcorelinux.org> | 2019-03-19 11:37:34 +0000 |
commit | b7b97785ebbb2f11d24d14dab8b81ed274f4ce6a (patch) | |
tree | 9fd110f9fc996e8a4213eeda994a8c112491b86d /dev-libs/openssl/files | |
parent | 066d27181e9a797ad9f8fc43b49fc9a10ff2f707 (diff) |
gentoo resync : 19.03.2019
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files')
-rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1b-CVE-2019-1543.patch | 66 |
1 files changed, 66 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1b-CVE-2019-1543.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1b-CVE-2019-1543.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4d478c484c90 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1b-CVE-2019-1543.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for +every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) +should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and +front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it +also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case +only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are +ignored. + +It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. +Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious +confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the +default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to +the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique +nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a +reused nonce. + +Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the +integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the +integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further +affected. + +Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe +because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user +applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce +length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. + +CVE-2019-1543 + +Fixes #8345 + +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406) + +(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6) +--- + crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c +index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644 +--- a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c ++++ b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c +@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct { + + #define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data) + ++#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN 12 ++ + static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], + const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc) +@@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, + return 1; + + case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: +- if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE) ++ if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN) + return 0; + actx->nonce_len = arg; + return 1; |